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Every positive value has its price in negative terms.
-Pablo Picasso
INTRODUCTION
Here comes a transformation, again. Health information technology
(HIT) has become a signal element of federal health policy, especially as
the recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(Recovery Act or ARRA)' comprises numerous provisions related to HIT
and commits tens of billions of dollars to its development and adoption.2
These provisions charge various agencies of the federal government with
both general and specific HIT-related implementation tasks including,
inter alia, providing funding for HIT in various contexts: the implemen-
tation of interoperable HIT, HIT-related infrastructure, and HIT-related
training and research. The Recovery Act also contains various regulatory
provisions pertaining to HIT. Provisions of the Recovery Act that address
HIT directly require the establishment of the Office of the National Co-
ordinator for Health Information Technology (ONCHIT or ONC) at the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)' and specify incentive
payments for health care professionals and hospitals to implement, im-
4
prove, and maintain HIT under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
I. The "American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009" is the short title of H.R. I,
"Making supplemental appropriations for job preservation and creation, infrastructure invest-
ment, energy efficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal
stabilization, for fiscal year ending September 30, 2009, and for other purposes." American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009).
2. Although $19, $20, and $22 billion price tags have been associated with Recovery
Act HIT spending, HIT-related outlays contemplated in the statute appear to be much higher
still. A partial tally may be gleaned from notes 3-4, infra. See generally Letter from Douglas
W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member,
Comm. on Fin., U.S. S., tbl.2 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/docl0008/
03-02-MacroEffects ofARRA.pdf.
3. See Recovery Act § 3001. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated
budget authority of $2 billion and outlays of $1.98 billion associated with Title XIII. Letter
from Douglas W. Elmendorf, supra note 2, at tbl.2.
4. For these provisions in Division B, Title IV, of the Recovery Act, CBO estimates
net outlays at $20.819 billion. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, supra note 2, at tbl.2. That
estimate supposes substantial savings in later years. For example, CBO-estimated total outlays
for Medicare incentives total $36.347 billion from 2009 through 2015, but anticipated negative
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Although the magnitude of this commitment to HIT is striking, the
impetus is clear enough.' Many have argued that the growth of HIT is
critical to improving quality and efficiency in health care delivery.6 It
appears that HIT has the potential to reduce medical errors,' duplicative
testing and procedures, 8 and substantial administrative costs now attrib-
uted to incomplete, hard-to-find, or otherwise faulty paper records.9
Although significant use of computers in health care dates to at least the
1950s, many areas of health care trail other sectors of the economy in
their use of information technology. How is it that in many practices, the
use of expensive and highly sophisticated technology-such as magnetic
resonance imaging-is common, but the use of simple technology-
such as computerized lookup tables to check both general and patient-
specific contraindications for prescription medicines-is not?
The answer is not so simple. On the one hand, certain barriers to
widespread adoption of HIT have been plain enough and are well docu-
mented. As described below, the costs of adoption, which are borne
chiefly by health care providers, can be high, including not only the ac-
quisition of hardware and software but often costs associated with
modifying HIT systems to suit particular practices, training for users,
and prospective maintenance and updating costs.' ° At the same time, the
outlays (savings) total $15.528 billion from 2016 through 2019. HI-S has estimated spending
"$44.7 billion in incentives through Medicare and Medicaid to encourage physicians and hos-
pitals to adopt certified electronic health record (EHR) technology." Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., Fiscal Year 2010 Budget in Brief: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
http://www.hhs.gov/asrt/ob/docbudget/2010budgetinbriefc.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
Outlays may run to $50 billion, as they represent mandatory spending in payments due to all
physicians and hospitals complying with the required criteria. See Tevi Troy, 5 Myths on
Health Care's Electronic Fix-It, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2009, at B3. Smaller allocations to HIT-
related programs are made elsewhere in the Act, while other provisions provide for the fund-
ing of various programs that include, but are not limited to, HIT.
5. Certainly, many private and public initiatives precede this one. Indeed, the ONC
itself was initially established not under the Recovery Act's statutory mandate, but under a
2004 executive order. See Exec. Order No. 13,335, 69 Fed. Reg. 24,059 (Apr. 30, 2004) [here-
inafter 2004 Exec. Order].
6. See Richard Hillestad et al., Can Electronic Medical Record Systems Transform
Health Care? Potential Health Benefits, Savings, and Costs, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 1103
(2005).
7. See BD. ON HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED., PREVENTING MEDICATION ER-
RORS 5 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2006) (estimating a minimum of 1.5 million preventable
medication errors per year in hospitals, nursing homes, and ambulatory care settings in the
United States). The IOM has also identified HIT as a promising means of reducing the fre-
quency of such errors. See id. at 6, 223-36.
8. See id. at 13-14 (discussing the importance of electronic prescribing and other HIT
in reducing medication errors).
9. See id. at 6, 13-14, 223-36.
10. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EVIDENCE ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HEALTH
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 17-18 (May 2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
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benefits of adoption tend to be distributed, accruing mostly to payers,
patients, and public health rather than to the health care providers who
pay the direct costs of adoption. The Recovery Act promises to shift that
balance of costs and benefits in a way that is bound to be significant.
Specifically, the Act's financial incentives for adoption should make at
least a marginal difference for many practitioners, practices, and hospi-
tals.
The problem of adoption has not, however, been a simple problem of
misaligned incentives, and it is unlikely that the allocation or re-
allocation of funds will remove all of the barriers to the widespread
adoption of fully functioning, interconnected, HIT systems by U.S.
health care providers. First, despite the considerable promise of HIT,
implementation can be difficult, and deliverable off-the-shelf benefits
are unclear to many providers, independent of price and payment ques-
tions. Other significant impediments to HIT adoption include complex
"cultural" barriers among practitioners and patients, standard-setting
issues, network externalities, and regulatory costs. These are surveyed
briefly below, both because some general background is useful to our
particular discussion and because these impediments are, in various
ways, interrelated. Our focus in this Article, however, will be on one par-
ticular species of regulatory costs-those imposed by certain sorts of
privacy and data security regulations, with special attention to state law
privacy and data security regimes.
There are several reasons for this focus. First, lowering these sorts of
barriers may sometimes be tractable and cost-effective. Regulatory re-
form is not always low-hanging fruit, but it may be more practicable in
the short run than, say, reworking the medical practice habits of several
generations of established, working physicians. Second, emerging re-
search casts new light on the relationship between privacy regulation and
HIT in ways important to HIT policy. Recently, several authors have
provided cogent analyses of the implications of HIT for health informa-
tion privacy, and have suggested regulatory modifications to ensure that
privacy remains protected." In addition, emerging research suggests that,
by increasing the costs of inter-hospital communication of health infor-
mation, certain state privacy laws tend to suppress the network benefits
associated with HIT, and thus tend to reduce the rate of HIT adoption by
91 xx/doc9168/05-20-HealthIT.pdf.bcsi-scanDA3493EE5FC9D524=0&bcsi-scan-filename=
\05-20-Health[T.pdf.
II. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Electronic Health Record Systems,
22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 104, 121-22 (2008); Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Protecting
Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 335-38 (2007); Nicolas P. Terry
& Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681,682.
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hospitals in those states that have such laws.'2 That result may not be
wholly surprising, as many stakeholders have suggested that certain state
laws may impede HIT adoption,' 3 and that the mix, or patchwork, of
state regulation is problematic as it stands.' 4 Third, building on both
these strands of research, we will argue that policy makers should con-
sider tradeoffs between two important policy goals that are to some
extent in tension: (1) regulatory protections for health information pri-
vacy and (2) the flow of health information, which is a central goal of
HIT. The Recovery Act does not seem to recognize such tradeoffs, al-
though we hope that they may figure in its implementation.
At one level, tradeoffs between privacy and HIT are inevitable. HIT
facilitates the collection, storage, processing, and flow of health informa-
tion. Privacy and data security depend, at least, on the absence of
unwanted access to or sharing of health information. Hence, many of the
benefits associated with HIT arise from rapid and low-cost information
sharing between disparate parts of the health care system, but laws de-
signed to protect health privacy are designed to make the flow of health
care information more costly. Indeed many states have been working to
update and harmonize their regulatory requirements in this area in rec-
ognition of such problems.'" In this Article, we examine the balance
between patients' legitimate concerns about the breach of health infor-
mation privacy and security, on the one hand, and the HIT-associated
benefits that may be threatened by excessive and highly variable privacy
regulation, on the other. As has been argued in the context of financial
privacy,6 we contend that HIT privacy policy should be guided by the
12. See, e.g., Amalia R. Miller & Catherine Tucker, Privacy Protection and Technology
Diffusion: The Case of Electronic Medical Records 55 MGMT. SC. 1077 (2009) (discussing
the differential effects of state law medical privacy regimes on hospitals' adoption of HIT).
13. See, e.g., LINDA L. DIMITROPOULOS, PRIVACY AND SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR IN-
TEROPERABLE HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE: NATIONWIDE SUMMARY 6-3 (2007)
[hereinafter NATIONWIDE SUMM.] ("Several states reported that antiquated laws written for
paper-only environments created significant barriers to electronic health information ex-
change.").
14. See, e.g., Linda Dimitropoulos & Stephanie Rizk, A State-Based Approach to
Privacy and Security for Interoperable Health Information Exchange, 28 HEALTH AFF. 428,
428-29 (2009) ("An interoperable system of HIE [health information exchange]-that is, one
in which various parties can share and exchange data among them-will have difficulty ac-
commodating the current range of variation in policy requirements."); see also, e.g., J. Thomas
Rosch, Comm'r, F.T.C., Where Do We Go From Here?-Some Thoughts on the Future of the
Consumer Protection Mission (Jan. 29, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/rosch/070129RoschABAconsprotconf.pdf).
15. See, e.g., NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-39 to 6-44 (reporting on various
cross-state and interstate initiatives to address interstate variation, including efforts to harmo-
nize state medical privacy laws across certain states).
16. See J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting
Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 118-20 (2008).
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expected consequences of breach-both tangible harms and the impact
on the intrinsic value that patients find in health information privacy.
Data suggest that the former harms are small, and we suggest that policy
makers should develop a keener understanding of the latter, which is
likely to vary across the population in both quality and magnitude.
We investigate the expected tangible privacy harms related to HIT
and find them to be less stark than some may believe. For example, from
2001 to 2005, about 0.111% of the adult population suffered medical
insurance account misuse (defined as the use of personal information to
obtain or receive payment for medical treatment, services or goods), and
only 0.0148% of the adult population had their personal data used to
create a new medical insurance policy.'7 Further, it does not appear that
consent or breach-notification requirements significantly reduce the tan-
gible harms caused by the privacy violations that do occur. Rather, most
benefits from medical privacy regulations likely accrue in the utility that
patients derive from the fact that they have dominion over their personal
medical information. This likelihood strongly suggests that policy mak-
ers need to develop a clearer understanding of patients' underlying
preferences for medical privacy before expanding regulatory burdens, as
they ought to be wary of adopting costly regulations that may promise
modest tangible benefits. In light of the existing data on consumer pref-
erences for privacy, we propose a modified federal Privacy Rule that
maintains the exception to consent for medical treatment, but also allows
privacy-sensitive patients to sequester their records from interoperable
HIT systems altogether. We also suggest that breach notification triggers
should be related to actual risk of harm and that a focus on data security
may be a more efficient substitute for both consent and breach notifica-
tion requirements.
We also focus on the costs associated with varying state regulation
of medical privacy. Although we do not advocate any particular legisla-
tive response to the costs of state regulation, we explain how the express
preemption of state health information privacy and data security provi-
sions could be an efficient response to the costs of those provisions. In
addition, although the implied preemption arguments advanced by the
petitioners (and rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court) in another health
17. See SYNOVATE, 2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 17, 19 (2007), http:H
www.ftc.gov/os/2007/1 I/SynovateFinalReportlDTheft2006.pdf [hereinafter SYNOVATE 2006
REPORT]. These calculations are based on an estimate of 3.7% of the adult population being a
victim of ID theft. Id. at II. Of the surveyed victims of ID theft, 3% suffered reported misuse
of existing medical insurance accounts. Id. at 17. Also, 0.04% of surveyed ID theft victims
reported that new medical insurance accounts were opened using the stolen information. Id. at
19. Thus, .03 * .037 = 0.00111 of the adult population suffered misuse of their existing medi-
cal insurance accounts and .004 * .037 = 0.000148 of the adult population suffered new
medical insurance account fraud.
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care context, that of Wyeth v. Levine, '8 are precluded by statute in this
one,' 9 policy arguments in favor of preemption in this area may enjoy
certain advantages that, at least in the Court's view, were not available to
the petitioners in Wyeth.
Nothing in the following discussion should be read to assail the no-
tion that some form of regulatory intervention is appropriate to safeguard
the substantial consumer interests at stake in the area of health informa-
tion privacy.2° But excessive regulation, or a poorly integrated patchwork
of federal and state regulations, could impede innovations that would be
beneficial to health care consumers, public health, and the fisc.2' Even
well-intentioned regulations can be costly, and the research community
only recently has begun to grapple with the broader costs-including the
economic and health costs-of various means of safeguarding consumer
privacy. Because substantial attention rightly is being paid to the con-
sumer interests at stake in HIT privacy and data security, we focus here
on the other side of the cost/benefit divide.
This Article is unique because, in addition to its use of independent
research, it draws heavily from information gathered at a 2008 Federal
Trade Commission workshop that examined certain innovations in health
care delivery (the Workshop).22 The Article proceeds as follows. Part II
comprises several brief background sections: (a) summarizes certain
general information about HIT development and adoption; (b) reviews
certain costs and benefits associated with HIT; and (c) provides an over-
view of federal and state health information privacy and data security
law. Part III returns to the question of benefits and barriers associated
18. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193-94(2009).
19. Regulations promulgated under HIPAA with regard to "the privacy of individually
identifiable health information shall not supercede a contrary provision of State law, if the
provision of State law imposes requirements, standards, or implementation specifications that
are more stringent than the requirements, standards, or implementation specifications imposed
under the regulation." Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
§ 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. 2033-34, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2009).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Skodnek, 933 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1996) (describing
harms to consumers related to defendant psychiatrist who was fined and incarcerated follow-
ing convictions for making false claims to the Medicare program, mail fraud, obstruction of
justice, and witness intimidation); cf ALAN F. WESTIN, How THE PUBLIC VIEWS PRIVACY AND
HEALTH RESEARCH 13-14 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
healthcarewrkshp/534908-00001.pdf (suggesting through nationwide survey data that 58% of
respondents believe medical-record privacy is insufficiently protected).
21. See Amalia Miller, Professor, Dep't of Econ., Univ. of Va., Address at Federal Trade
Commission Workshop on Innovations in Health Care Delivery 225-32, 251-52
(Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.govlbclhealthcarelhcdldocs/
hcdwksptranscript.pd).
22. The main web page for the April 24, 2008 FTC Workshop, Innovations in Health
Care Delivery, with links to the Workshop agenda, a complete transcript of the Workshop
itself, supporting materials, and public comments, is available at http://
www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/hcd/index .shtm.
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with HIT, providing a more focused discussion of network effects in
HIT. Part IV examines consumers' demand for privacy generally and
health information privacy specifically. Part V then analyzes the implicit
tradeoffs between various types of privacy regulation and the adoption
and application of HIT. Part VI considers the federal preemption of state
regulation of health information privacy and data security as a feasible
policy response to the costs of regulatory variation.
I. TECHNICAL, MARKET, AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. The Development and Adoption of HIT
As noted above, many areas of health care trail other sectors of the
economy in their use of information technology. Recent years, however,
have seen a proliferation of utilities, systems, hardware, and analytics,
including electronic health records, personal health records, electronic
prescribing, and the collection, analysis, and flow of increasingly rich
types of health information. Generally speaking, HIT "refers to com-
puter applications for the practice of medicine. 23 "Applications" in this
context, encompass software and hardware applications and their out-
puts, as well as analytic, training, and other support services that might
enhance the use of such applications.
The Recovery Act stipulates that "'health information technology'
means hardware, software, integrated technologies or related licenses,
intellectual property, upgrades, or packaged solutions sold as services
that are designed for or support the use by health care entities or patients
for the electronic creation, maintenance, access, or exchange of health
information. 24 Just as the Recovery Act thus defines HIT generally for
certain of its own purposes, it is important to understand that HIT com-
prises myriad products and services, such as (a) electronic medical
records-including patient records, clinical decision support, laboratory
records, health plan records, records exchange systems, and personal
health records, (b) clinical ancillaries and other kinds of clinical infor-
mation systems, such as labs, radiology, and image management
systems, (c) biomedical devices, including medical device data systems,
(d) population HIT, including "not just public health reporting, which is
moving to an electronic basis, but also registries such as disease regis-
tries, immunization registries, and . . . statistical analysis and reporting
such as quality of process, quality of outcomes and health disparities
23. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at I.
24. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), § 3000(5), 123
Stat. 115, 229 (2009).
A Time to Keep Silent and a Time to Speak
analysis that would count in the population health area of health IT," and
(e) applications serving the administrative and financial sectors of medi-
cine.2-
Note, too, that there appears to be substantial variation in usage in
26broader discussions of HIT, and that definitions may continue to change
in the course of HIT development. As a practical matter, this Article
makes no attempt to force the larger HIT policy discussion-including
published research-to conform to particular stipulated definitions of
HIT applications. At the same time, certain extant definitions of central
HIT applications provide a useful baseline. In 2008, the National Alli-
ance for Health Information Technology offered the following
definitions in a report to the ONC:
" Electronic Medical Record [eMR]: An electronic record of
health-related information on an individual that can be cre-
ated, gathered, managed, and consulted by authorized
clinicians and staff within one health care organization.
* Electronic Health Record [eHR]: An electronic record of
health-related information on an individual that conforms to
nationally recognized interoperability standards and that can
be created, managed, and consulted by authorized clinicians
and staff across more than one health care organization.
" Personal Health Record [PHR]: An electronic record of
health-related information on an individual that conforms to
nationally recognized interoperability standards and that can
be drawn from multiple sources while being managed, shared,
and controlled by the individual.27
25. At the FTC Workshop, Mr. Ferguson provided roughly this overview of HIT appli-
cations, devices, and services. James Ferguson, Exec. Dir., Health I.T. Strategy & Policy,
Kaiser Permanente, Address at Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Innovations in Health
Care Delivery 135-36 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
healthcare/hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pd f).
26. See, e.g., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PERSONAL HEALTH RECORDS AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE I, http://www.hhs.govlocr/
privacy/hipaa/understanding/speciallhealthit/phrs.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2010) ("There is
currently no universal definition of a [Personal Health Record], although several relatively
similar definitions exist within the industry.")
27. NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., DEFINING KEY HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY TERMS 6 (2008), http://healthit.hhs.gov/ (use the search bar to locate the docu-
ment and then follow the hyperlink).
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For the most part, the Recovery Act appears to have borrowed from these
in its stipulated HIT definitions.28 Also important is electronic prescrib-
ing (eRx), which has been "defined by the eHealth Initiative as 'the use
of computing devices to enter, modify, review, and output or communi-
cate drug prescriptions.' ,,29
Again, many have argued that the growth of HIT is centrally impor-
tant to improving quality and efficiency in health care.0 Both the general
promise of HIT and its demonstrated efficiencies in particular implemen-
tations have garnered substantial private and public commitment to HIT
development and adoption. Large IT businesses are increasingly in-
volved in HIT development;3' large employers have been interested in
the potential benefits of HIT for their health care benefits programs;
and prior to the Recovery Act's enactment, HHS and other federal agen-
28. For example, under the Recovery Act, an "electronic health record" (eHR) is "an
electronic record of health-related information on an individual that is created, gathered, man-
aged, and consulted by authorized health care clinicians and staff." Recovery Act § 13400(5).
29. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Electronic Prescribing, http:I/
healthit.ahrq.gov/ (follow the "Electronic Prescribing" hyperlink in the "Key Topics" box)
(last visited Mar. 24, 2010). We stipulate the use of "eRx" as a convenient abbreviation for
electronic prescribing for the purposes of this Article.
30. See, e.g., Hillestad et al., supra note 6, at 1103.
31. For example, the Workshop included a presentation on Microsoft's Health Vault, a
platform supporting web-based PHRs and the development of various HIT applications that
might interconnect with such PHRs. George Scriban, Senior Product Manager, HealthVault,
Microsoft, Address at Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Innovations in Health Care
Delivery 235-48 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/
hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf). Discussion also included the third-party PHR application
Google Health, which, like Health Vault, provides individual health care consumers with web-
based tools with which to populate their records. See Deven McGraw, Dir., Health Privacy
Project, Ctr. of Democracy and Tech., Address at Federal Trade Commission Workshop on
Innovations in Health Care Delivery 145 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf); see also Google Health,
http://www.google.com/health (last visited June 6, 2008). At the same time, part of what is
striking about HIT development is the extent to which health care providers themselves have
found it necessary to develop such proprietary HIT systems. At the Workshop, the Mayo
Clinic's Dr. Wood remarked, "We found the need to develop [Mayo's applications] mostly on
our own, because we have not found opportunities with partners who can develop them with
us.'" Dr. Douglas Wood, Dept. of Med., Health Care Policy Research Group, Mayo Clinic,
Address at Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Innovations in Health Care Delivery 169
(Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/hcd/docs/
hcdwksptranscript.pdf). Another panelist noted that Marshfield Clinic has developed its core
HIT systems since implementing its first eMR module in 1985. Thomas Berg, Dir. & Special
Projects Manager, Clinical Info. Servs., Marshfield Clinic, Address at Federal Trade Commis-
sion Workshop on Innovations in Health Care Delivery 200-01 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript
available at http://www.ftc.govlbc/healthcare/hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf).
32. For example, Dossia is a consortium of large employers, including AT&T, Applied
Materials, BP America, Inc., Cardinal Health, Intel Corporation, Pitney Bowes, Sanofi-
Aventis, and Wal-Mart, who jointly developed and provide a PHR system for the voluntary use
of their employees. A Dossia web site describing the consortium, its PHR, and its privacy
policies is available at http://www.dossia.org/.
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cies had devoted considerable resources to the development and promo-
tion of HIT."3
Today, some large medical centers and health care systems are all
but paperless, with systems at Marshfield Clinic, the Mayo Clinic, and
Kaiser Permanente being described at some length at the FTC Work-
shop." For example, Marshfield Clinic-which comprises about 45
health care facilities in Wisconsin and has integrated eHRs for about 2
million patients-reported that all specialties in its various clinics use
the same integrated eHRs and that all inputs into the eHRs by the
roughly 1200 physicians affiliated with Marshfield are done electroni-
cally.
35
At the same time, the adoption of HIT, interoperability of HIT sys-
tems, and integration of health information has in many places lagged
behind expectations. 36 In fact, paper-based patient record systems still
dominate in U.S. medical practice, especially in small practice settings.37
Only about four percent of U.S. physicians have access to a fully-
functional eHR system, and only about thirteen percent have access to a
33. For example, although the ONC is established by statute under the Recovery Act, it
initially was created to spearhead and integrate HIT initiatives in response to a 2004 executive
order. 2004 Exec. Order, supra note 5.
34. Other systems, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA's) VistA system,
also were discussed. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 31, at 199-201 (discussing the Marshfield
Clinic); Ferguson, supra note 25, at 134-35 (discussing Kaiser-Permanente); Dr. Robert M.
Kolodner, Nat'l Coordinator, Health Info. Tech., Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., Address at
Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Innovations in Health Care Delivery 293
(April 24, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/hcd/docs/
hcdwksptranscript.pdf) (discussing the VA); Wood, supra note 31, at 169 (discussing the
Mayo Clinic); see also, e.g., Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-0224, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, BENEFITS REALIZED FOR SELECTED HEALTH CARE FUNCTIONS 36 (Oct. 2003)
(regarding Kaiser-Permanente), available at http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/dO4224.pdf [here-
inafter GAO 2003 REPORT]; Id. at 46-47 (regarding Mayo Clinic); Id. at 61-62 (regarding
VA's VistA).
35. Berg, supra note 31, at 199-201.
36. "Despite the efforts of the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics ...
and other groups, progress in health IT in the United States has been too slow." Robert M.
Kolodner et al., Health Information Technology: Strategic Initiatives, Real Progress,
HEALTH AFF. w39 1, w391-w392 (2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprintI
hlthaff.27.5.w391 v 1; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 3 ("Despite the poten-
tial of health IT to increase efficiency and improve quality, though, very few providers as of
2006, about 12 percent of physicians and I I percent of hospitals have adopted it"). But cf
Edward H. Shortliffe, Strategic Action in Health Information Technology: Why the Obvious
Has Taken So Long, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1222, 1223 (2005) (examining slow growth in HIT "in
context by assessing what has succeeded and what still remains to be realized, while asking
what barriers exist that have prevented optimal progress to date").
37. David Gans et al., Medical Groups' Adoption of Electronic Health Records and
Information Systems, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1323, 1325-26 (2005).
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basic system. According to one recent paper, "only 1.5% of U.S. hospi-
tals have a comprehensive electronic-records system (i.e., present in all
clinical units), and an additional 7.6% have a basic system (i.e., present
in at least one clinical unit). Computerized provider-order entry for
medications has been implemented in only 17% of hospitals.!'
Indeed, the most basic policy issue in HIT may be the relative pace
of its development and adoption. That is, given the public and private
benefits anticipated with HIT-many of which have been observed in
particular institutional settings-how is it that HIT markets are not more
developed?40 Why is HIT use not more common?
B. Potential Benefits and Costs of HIT
1. Benefits
Broadly, HIT benefits flow from two sources: stand-alone and net-
work efficiencies.4 Stand-alone efficiencies are those that accrue
internally to an office, clinic, or hospital from its use of HIT, and may
include reduced administrative and error costs. Network benefits are
those that are realized across multiple health care service providers:
when various parts of the health care system are able to communicate
efficiently, each part enjoys increasing benefits as the scope of the net-
work from which information may be drawn increases. In HIT such
network benefits are likely to be more substantial than stand-alone bene-
fits. 42 Most patients see multiple providers in a given year," and
providers often rely on external entities to perform lab and radiology
work." But, as the former National Coordinator for HIT has explained,
38. Catherine M. DesRoches et al., Electronic Health Records in Ambulatory Care-A
National Survey of Physicians, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 50, 50 (2008) (basing these statistics
on a national survey of 2,758 physicians).
39. Ashish K. Jha et al., Use of Electronic Health Records in U.S. Hospitals, NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1628, 1628 (2009).
40. Many have been concerned about rates of adoption of HIT in different areas of
health care; that is, substantially, a concern that demand has lagged behind expectations. In
addition, however, there have been concerns that the supply of certain HIT utilities and HIT
support services have been slow to meet demand. See, e.g., Wood, supra 31, at 169; Berg,
supra 31, at 200.
41. See Miller & Tucker, supra note 12, at 1080.
42. See David J. Brailer, Interoperability: The Key to Future Health Care System,
HEALTH AFF. w5-19, w5-20 (2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org (use the search bar to lo-
cate the document and then follow the hyperlink).
43. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note I1, at 113 (reporting that the average Medi-
care patient visits seven different physicians in a given year); see also Brailer, supra note 42,
at w5-19.
44. See Jan Walker et al., The Value of Health Care Information Exchange and herop-
erability, HEALTH AFF. w5-0, w5-13-w5-14 (2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org (use the
search bar to locate the document and then follow the hyperlink).
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"[flragmentation ... results in errors, duplication, lack of coordination,
and many other problems.*'"
Although the flow of information should reduce fragmentation, the
benefits of HIT on a national scale are very difficult to predict. As a
CBO report has observed, "[n]o aspect of health IT entails as much un-
certainty as the magnitude of its potential benefits.'"6 A well-cited
RAND report estimates that "effective EMR implementation could even-
tually save more than $81 billion annually. '4 Others have been critical of
the RAND estimates.48 The CBO, for example, has argued that the
RAND study does not adequately distinguish between possible and
likely benefits to HIT adoption, concluding that it is "not an appropriate
guide to estimating the effects of legislative proposals aimed at boosting
the use of health IT.' 49 Such disputes may be difficult to resolve in any
precise way in the short run. In brief, possible HIT benefits may be sub-
stantial, highly variable according to particular implementations, and
otherwise uncertain.
At least locally, HIT has led to concrete qualitative improvements in
health care services, according to process measures or outcome meas-
ures. One FTC Workshop panelist described, for example, a hospital
system's adherence to the evidence-based process standard of ACE in-
hibitor prescription following myocardial infarction ("heart attack")
upon discharge. In that case, implementation of evidence-based HIT
clinical guidance at InterMountain Healthcare reportedly increased ad-
herence to the standard from about 65% to about 95%-a process
improvement-which reduced significantly the readmission rate-an
45. Brailer, supra note 42, at w5-19; see also Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note II, at
113 (stating that when doctors do not communicate and coordinate a patient's care "any one of
them may miss vital information that is critical to the individual's welfare").
46. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 6.
47. Hillestad et al., supra note 6, at 1103.
48. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 8-9 (claiming RAND overestimates
probable benefits of HIT); but cf David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Hope And
Hype: Predicting The Impact Of Electronic Medical Records, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1121, 1122
(2005) (arguing that the RAND analysis is a form of "hype" that "reveals a disturbing array of
unproven assumptions, wishful thinking, and special effects"). We note that the RAND re-
port's estimate is not generated by precisely the same problem as the CBO's critique of that
estimate. Briefly, the RAND report addresses possible benefits of large-scale eMR adoption.
Although the authors provide reasons to think that their estimate represents neither a "best
case" nor a "worst case" scenario, they recognize that "the currently useful evidence is not
robust enough to make strong predictions." Hillestad et al., supra note 6, at 1104-05. The
CBO Report offers very useful analysis, but it does not offer any particular cost-benefit analy-
sis attached to any particular legislative proposal, and like the RAND report, it does not appear
to approach a comprehensive assessment of possible benefits (or costs) to HIT adoption.
49. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 4.
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outcome improvement." That is consistent with survey data suggesting
that physicians who employ eHRs report greater avoidance of costly
medical errors, including, "having averted a known drug allergic reaction
(80%) or a potentially dangerous drug interaction (71%), being alerted to
a critical laboratory value (90%), ordering a critical laboratory test
(68%) and providing preventive care (69%).
A 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, based on data
from ten private and public health care delivery organizations, three in-
surers, and one community data network, described substantial
efficiency gains in both administrative function and delivery of care
across settings.12 For example, Mayo Clinic, a 1,951-bed teaching hospi-
tal, achieved annual savings of about $8.6 million by replacing paper
medical charts with electronic medical records for outpatients, $2.85
million by replacing manual medical record handling processes with
electronic access to lab results and reports, $ 2.9 million by automating
correspondence, and $7 million by reducing un-billable tests and billing
patients directly. 3 Single-site studies have also been promising. For ex-
ample, a study of the effects of eRx at Brigham and Women's Hospital
indicated "large differences ... for all main types of medication errors:
dose errors, frequency errors, route errors, substitution errors, and aller-
gies!. '
50. Dr. Mark Dente, Vice President, Health Care Solutions & Integrated IT Solutions,
GE Health Care, Address at Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Innovations in Health
Care Delivery 277 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/
hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf) (describing HIT benefits at InterMountain Healthcare, a
network of hospitals and clinics in Utah). Dr. Dente also described improvements in ventilator
management with the implementation of evidence-based systems at InterMountain. In that
case, he reported both significant improvement in the survival rate and a significant savings,
approximately $120,000 per case, due to the implementation of HIT-based clinical support. Id.
at 276-77.
51. DesRoches et al., supra note 38, at 54 (reporting on "fully functional" eHRs, al-
though those with more basic systems reported "the same effects but less commonly").
52. See generally, GAO 2003 REPORT, supra note 34.
53. Id. at 46, 48.
54. David W. Bates et al., The Impact of Computerized Physician Order Entry on Medi-
cation Error Prevention, 6 J. AM. MED. INFORMATIcs ASS'N. 313, 313 (1999); see also, e.g.,
Hagop S. Mekhjian et al., Immediate Benefits Realized Following Implementation of Physician
Order Entry at an Academic Medical Center, 9 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS Ass'N. 529, 529,
539 (2002) (reporting that the joint introduction of computerized physician order entries
(CPOEs) and eMR systems at Ohio State University Health System improved patient care by,
for example, reducing tum-around times and eliminating all nursing and physician transcrip-
tion errors); Kirsten Colpaert et al., Impact of Computerized Physician Order Entry on
Medication Prescription Errors in the Intensive Care Unit: A Controlled Cross-Sectional
Trial, 10 CRITICAL CARE R21 (2006), available at http:l/ccforum.com/contentll0/l/R21 (re-
porting that HIT implementation in the ICU resulted in significant decreases in the occurrence
and severity of medication errors).
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At the same time, it is not clear from either the GAO Report or other
studies that the reported efficiency gains represent net gains for the
adopters. Also, although single-site studies demonstrating gains in clini-
cal quality at academic medical centers are promising, results have been
somewhat mixed, and there have been relatively few studies measuring
qualitative gains using longitudinal national data. One recent study em-
ploying national data observes that EMRs "have a clear and statistically
significant effect on patient safety," as they are associated with fewer
infections attributable to medical care in hospitals, but that the observed
effect is limited to one of the study's quality measures and, while "prom-
ising," is "small."5 In addition, the promise of any gains may be at risk,
as there have been significant problems with particular HIT implementa-
-56tions.
Electronic prescribing illustrates both the potential benefits of HIT
and the extent to which such benefits are uncertain prior to implementa-
tion. As noted above, eRx has long been considered an important and
tractable area for HIT development and adoption. Preventable medica-
tion errors are numerous. The oft-cited 2006 IOM Report, PREVENTING
MEDICATION ERRORS, for example, estimated that "at least 1.5 million
preventable ADEs [adverse drug events] occur each year in the United
States."'7 These errors inevitably impose medical costs, which, in turn,
18may impose substantial expense on private and public payers.
The IOM Report suggested that eRx holds special promise for error
avoidance,59 and there are good reasons to agree. First, many errors
55. Stephen T. Parente & Jeffrey S. McCullough, Health Information Technology and
Patient Safety: Evidence from Panel Data, 28 HEALTH AFF. 357, 358 (2009).
56. See, e.g., Yong Y. Han et al., Unexpected Increased Mortality After tmplementation
of a Commercially Sold Computerized Physician Order Entry System, 116 PEDIATRICS 1506,
1506 (2005) (reporting an unexpected increase in mortality rates among children who were
referred and admitted to the hospital after eRx implementation); Ross Koppel et al., Role of
Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems in Facilitating Medical Errors, 293 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N. 1197, 1198 (2005) (documenting errors associated with implementation of a widely-
used, commercially-available computerized provider order entry system); Ceci Connolly,
Cedars-Sinai Doctors Cling to Pen and Paper, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2005, at AOl (describing
an unsuccessful attempt to implement a hospital-level electronic health record system and
reporting that up to 30% of such implementations fail).
57. INST. OF MED., supra note 7, at 5.
58. Id. at 5, 132. That cost estimate excludes both errors of omission (cases where
medication ought to have been prescribed and administered, but was not) and the larger eco-
nomic costs-such as missed work days-imposed by preventable ADEs. The report noted
that there are large gaps in our understanding of the costs of medication errors. Id. at 58. Nev-
ertheless, the report also suggested that, for example, in-hospital adverse drug events alone
might conservatively be estimated to cost $ 3.5 billion per year, in 2006 dollars. Id. at 132.
59. Id. at 229 ("By 2008, all prescribers should have plans in place to implement elec-
tronic prescribing."); see also Gilad J. Kuperman et al., Medication-Related Clinical Decision
Support in Computerized Provider Order Entry Systems: A Review, 14 J. AM. MED.
S pri ng 20101
294 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:279
appear to be caused by basic coding or information processing failures
that should be amenable to automated control.' In addition, adverse
events due to faulty drug or dose identity checking, failures in drug
knowledge, and limited patient knowledge (i.e., patient history, current
and recent medications, etc.), 61 should be reduced by eRx supported by
eMRs and computerized drug information. In particular institutional set-
tings, eRx has been associated with substantial reductions in preventable
adverse drug events
62 and direct financial costs.
63
On the other hand, there have been significant problems with par-
ticular implementations of eRx systems." For example, although eRx
implementation at the Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh appeared to re-
duce adverse drug events significantly during a nine-month study
period, 6 a subsequent study of mortality rates among children who were
referred and admitted to the hospital showed an unexpected increase in
mortality after implementation.i Such problems seem to arise in transi-
tion to an eRx system, with incomplete or fragmented eRx systems, or
with poor integration between training and practice standards on the one
hand and the HIT systems on the other. Those are not necessarily long-
term, much less intractable, problems. Still, they suggest the potential for
large transition costs in eRx adoption and may raise questions about the
INFORMATICS Ass'N. 29, 29 (2007) (reviewing literature and concluding that "CPOE ... with
clinical decision support ... can improve patient safety and lower medication-related costs").
60. INST. OF MED., supra note 7, at 121-22 (errors include transcription errors, order-
tracking errors, and inter-service communication errors).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., David W. Bates et al., supra note 54, at 313; Hagop S. Mekhjian et al.,
supra note 54, at 529, 539; Kirsten Colpaert et al., supra note 54.
63. See, e.g., W.M. Tierney et al., Physician Inpatient Order Writing on Microcomputer
Workstations: Effects on Resource Utilization, 269 J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 379, 379 (1993) (con-
cluding that a network of microcomputer workstations for writing all inpatient orders
significantly lowered patient charges and hospital costs); cf David W. Bates et al., The Costs
of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 307, 307 (1997)
(discussing substantial costs of ADEs and preventable ADEs).
64. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, supra note 56, at A01 (describing an unsuccessful attempt
to implement a hospital-level electronic health record system and reporting that up to 30% of
such implementations fail).
65. Jeffrey S. Upperman et al., The Impact of Hospitalwide Computerized Physician
Order Entry on Medical Errors in a Pediatric Hospital, 40 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 57, 57
(2005).
66. Han, supra note 56, at 1506; see also, e.g., Koppel, supra note 56, at 1198 (claim-
ing that the implementation of a widely-used and commercially-available CPOE system in an
urban tertiary-care teaching hospital was associated with numerous categories of errors).
67. The JAMA-published study noted, for example, that medication errors were exac-
erbated in the system under study by the fact that patient medication records were shown in
small fonts, across a large number of screens (up to 20), where patient names did not appear
on all screens, as well as by "hectic" workstations and "common" crashes of the CPOE sys-
tem. See id. at 1200-01.
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extent to which efficiency gains realized in particular institutional set-. 61
tings can be generalized.
2. Costs
One of the most obvious impediments to the adoption of HIT is its
substantial cost. As discussed in the previous section, acquisition and
implementation of HIT systems are costly, operating and maintenance
costs are ongoing, and HIT investments may be regarded as at-risk.
Regulatory costs, uncertainty, "cultural" aversions to HIT, and concerns
about liability exposure also are likely to slow adoption. And yet, as one
FTC Workshop panelist succinctly stated with respect to HIT invest-
ments, "there is no billing code for it.'69
HIT adoption costs are varied and substantial. The CBO has noted
that adoption costs include: (1) the initial fixed cost of the hardware,
software, and technical assistance necessary to install the system, (2)
licensing fees, (3) the expense of maintaining the system, and (4) the
"opportunity cost" of the time that health care providers could have
spent seeing patients but instead must devote to learning how to use the
new system and how to adjust their work practices accordingly. 0 Al-
though the data is limited, and there is some evidence HIT system prices
are falling, recent studies suggest that, (a) physicians' offices may be
expected to pay initial costs of $25,000-$45,000 to acquire an office-
based HIT system;7 (b) annual operating costs are 12-20% of initial
cost;72 (c) implementation costs for hospitals range from $3 million for
68. See Salomeh Keyhani et al., Electronic Health Records and the Quality of Care, 46
MED. CARE 1267 (2008). In this study, the authors conducted cross-sectional analyses of na-
tional data gathered in ambulatory care settings, including physician offices. Examining blood
pressure control in particular, the authors generally failed to find a relationship between eHR
adoption and the examined quality of care measures, and concluded that "[ilt is doubtful that
presence of an EHR alone can improve the quality of care." Id. at 1270; see also Jeffrey A.
Linder, et al., Electronic Health Record Use and the Quality of Ambulatory Care in the United
States, 167 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1400, 1400 (2007) (failing to find quality improve-
ments, on most measures, associated with eHRs as implemented in ambulatory care settings).
But cf DesRoches et al., supra note 38, at 50 (discussing quality improvements reported by
ambulatory care providers).
69. Ferguson, supra note 25, at 195. There have long been concerns about misaligned
payment incentives in health care markets associated with third-party payment and regula-
tion. See, e.g., F.T.C. & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION, Exec. Summ. 5 (2004), available at http:l/www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/
040723healthcarerpt.pdf [hereinafter A DOSE OF COMPETITION]. For example, as the
FTC/DOJ Report observes, "Government administered pricing by CMS inadvertently can
distort market competition .... CMS never decided as a matter of policy to provide greater
profits for cardiac surgery than many other types of service, but the [payment system] ...
tends to do so." Id. at Exec. Summ. 16.
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smaller hospitals to $7.9 million for large hospitals;" and (d) average
hospital operating costs are about 19% of one-time costs, or $2,700 per
bed] 4 CBO and others also have observed substantial operating costs
associated with HIT.
75
It appears that cost structures co-vary with rates of HIT adoption by
type and size of practice setting. For example, "[l]arge hospitals (200
beds or more) have three to four times greater adoption rates than those
of smaller hospitals (fewer than 50 beds),, 76 which may be due, in part,
to the ability of larger facilities to "take advantage of economies of scale
by spreading the fixed costs of health IT over a larger base. 77 Academic
medical centers also have relatively high adoption rates, 8 perhaps be-
cause certain HIT costs may be shared with (and are especially valuable
to) research and teaching functions of the hospitals. 79 Adoption rates also
vary according to practice size in group practice settings, with small
practice groups (5 full-time physicians or fewer) having the lowest rate
of eHR adoption and the highest percentage of paper medical records. °
Large medical centers also have expressed concerns about costs re-
sulting from the interruption or restructuring of work flow.8 ' The
integrated HIT system implemented at the Mayo Clinic may be consid-
ered a success in many ways. At the same time, Mayo acknowledges that
its eMR has "had its share of problems because it didn't really match the
physician workflow."82 In some ways, such costs are among the various
"cultural" barriers to HIT adoption, which have to do with providers' and
patients' comfort levels with HIT. For example, HIT may influence the
73. Id. at 18.
74. Id.
75. With regard to small offices, "[estimates of annual costs for operating and main-
taining the system ... range between about 12 percent and 20 percent of initial costs." Id.
(citing Robert H. Miller et al., The Value of Electronic Health Records in Solo or Small Prac-
tices, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1127 (2005); Samuel J. Wang et al., A Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Electronic Medical Records in Primary Care, 114 AM. J. MED. 397 (2003)). Hospital operat-
ing costs vary by size and type of hospital but are estimated to be about 19% of acquisition
costs, or $2,700 per bed. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 18.
76. Michael F. Furukawa et al., Adoption of Health Information Technology for Medica-
tion Safety in U.S. Hospitals, 2006, 27 HEALTH AFF. 865, 868 (2008).
77. Id. at 867.
78. Id. at 868.
79. Id. at 867.
80. See, e.g., Gans et al., supra note 37, at 1323, 1325. Also, "[blecause of the structure
of the tax code, most practices do not have retained earnings, and, consequently, the capital
equipment expenditures are funded directly from physician income." Id. at 1329.
81. See, e.g., Dr. Kevin Car', Physician Senior Manager for Clinical Transformation
Health Care, BearingPoint, Address at Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Innovations in
Health Care Delivery 153-54 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at http:l/www.ftc.gov/
bc/healthcare/hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf); Kolodner, supra note 34, at 294; Wood, supra
note 3 1, at 177.
82. Wood, supra note 3 1, at 17 1.
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way health care professionals collaborate and interact, in addition to the
way they keep and consult records and reference outside sources;83 it• - 84
may also influence the nature of patient/provider interactions. As one
FTC Workshop panelist explained, in many smaller practices, providers
may be especially likely to face the question "how ready and willing am
I to change the things that I do every single day"? 8'
Patients also may be wary of the ability of HIT systems to protect
their sensitive information. For example, survey data suggests that a
large proportion of consumers have concerns about the adequacy of ex-
tant privacy protections for their medical records and about the risks that
may be presented by inadequate privacy protections.6 Consumer appre-
hension about HIT can affect adoption rates of consumer-oriented HIT
products, such as PHRs. It also may reduce demand-side pressures for
providers to adopt HIT.87
The economic benefits of HIT adoption are thus uncertain, and HIT
investments generally have been regarded as at-risk investments, poten-
tial benefits notwithstanding. Uncertainty reduces the present value of
future HIT benefits, and thus private incentives for providers to adopt
HIT. As noted above, implementation may be difficult and clinical im-
provements may be uncertain. Expected benefits are likely to be a
positive function of one system's ability to communicate with others, but
providers may be unsure whether a system they adopt today will prove to
83. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 25, at 138-39.
84. Id.
85. Carr, supra note 81, at 154; see also Gans et al., supra note 37, at 1325-26.
86. See, e.g., McGraw, supra note 31, at 142 ("[Tlhe survey data is also very clear that
people have significant concerns about the privacy of their medical records, particularly in
electronic form."); see also Wood, supra note 31, at 184 (regarding Mayo Clinic surveys of
patient privacy concerns); Joy Pritts, Dir. for the Center of Med. Record Rights and Privacy,
Health Policy Inst., Georgetown Univ., Address at Federal Trade Commission Workshop on
Innovations in Health Care Delivery 287-88 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf); WESTIN, supra note 20, at
15 (providing nationwide survey data that suggests 58% believe medical record privacy is
insufficiently protected); MARKLE FOUND., AMERICANS OVERWHELMINGLY BELIEVE ELEC-
TRONIC PERSONAL HEALTH RECORDS COULD IMPROVE THEIR HEALTH (2008), available at
http://www.connectingforhealth.org/resources/ResearchBrief-200806.pdf; CAL. HEALTHCARE
FOUND., THE STATE OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN CALIFORNIA: CONSUMER
PERSPECTIVE 2 (2008), available at http://www.chcf.orgldocuments/chronicdisease/
HITConsumerSnapshot08.pdf (stating that a survey of California health care consumers shows
"most consumers in California are wary about using health information technology (HIT),
such as personal health records (PHRs)" although many consumers are interested in HIT and
use the Internet for health information); NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-36.
87. McGraw, supra note 31, at 195 ("But the improvements in health care quality and
the cost reductions ... that are there as potentials, are going to drive the other actors in the
system, consumers and purchasers ... to actually be on the demand side [of HIT adoption].");
Cf. Ferguson, supra note 25, at 138-39 (discussing popularity, among Kaiser consumers, of
secure online communications with providers, online appointment scheduling, online lab re-
sults, and online Rx refills).
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be "the right product"--one that will be interoperable tomorrow.8 Inter-
operability standards, or more developed certification, may help to
ameliorate such concerns, at least for some providers. 9 Providers also
have expressed concern about potential liability arising from the mis-
handling of patient information after it leaves their offices in electronic
form .9
In addition, although the interconnection and interoperability of
nodes in an adequately large network may be prerequisites to the flow of
health information, they cannot guarantee it. First, the extent to which
different providers see clinical utility in the free flow of health informa-
tion is likely to vary. Second, at the FTC Workshop, panelists suggested
that some providers may worry that interoperable HIT can facilitate
"business going out the door;"9' among other things, it may lower the
switching costs for patients who wish to switch providers, who may be
disinclined to reduce the preference (or lock-in) that their patients have
for them. Although federal law generally requires that consumers be
provided access to, and copies of, their medical records, 92 access may be
seen as costly if copies can be obtained only (a) within thirty days, (b)
following a written request, and (c) with a copying fee-perhaps espe-
cially if a consumer's record is fragmented and distributed across
different providers. Lowering the costs of the flow of information may
generally be beneficial for consumers and competition, but it is not nec-
essarily beneficial for all competitors.9' This may partly explain why the
actual flow of usable electronic health information between providers
appears low even in the context of limited eHR adoption. That is, it may
be that the problem of making a business case for the adoption of inter-
operable HIT systems can be, and often is, parsed from the problem of
88. Ferguson, supra note 25, at 192 (stating that providers prefer "a sense of comfort or
trust that they are buying the right product, that they are spending their limited resources on
things that they can use to get to a very basic level of coordination of care for their patients").
89. To the extent that some of the signal successes of HIT development have been real-
ized in proprietary systems developed and implemented by certain large, sophisticated health
care providers, further questions might be raised about the extent to which developing national
standards (and certification standards) may or may not impose heightened costs (or, poten-
tially, advantages) on certain established players.
90. See NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-36 to 6-37.
91. McGraw, supra note 31, at 195; cf Carr, supra note 81, at 194 (discussing provider
concerns about lost business as difficult to overcome and appeals that have been successful in
overcoming it).
92. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a) (2010).
93. Further, to the extent that HIT reduces consumers' switching costs, it may make
them more likely to comparison shop for providers. If so, price and quality transparency may
become more valuable. There could be a parallel issue for labor markets for health care pro-
fessionals. Reducing the cost of transferring a consumer's health care information might also
reduce the costs of changing employment or other business arrangements for that consumer's
caregivers.
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making a case for the sharing of health information via such systems-
something policy makers might keep in mind to the extent that the first
problem is solved via subsidies for adoption alone or adoption coupled
with narrow usage criteria.
The substantial costs associated with adoption would not necessarily
represent an intractable barrier if providers could capture fully the benefits
of their HIT investments; market forces should encourage the adoption of
efficient systems over time. However, although health care providers
clearly capture some of those benefits, many remain externalized.94 Hence,
private incentives to adopt HIT are likely lower than those that would be
socially efficient. As one FTC Workshop panelist explained, "You always
have the debate, why do I have to pay it because it is everybody else who
benefits, so they should pay."'' This incentive problem is due primarily to
two factors: (1) typically providers are not rewarded financially for im-
provements in efficiency and quality of care, and (2) HIT is subject to
network effects. In network industries--discussed in Part III, infra, of
this Article-consumers do not fully capture the benefits of their own
consumption and hence may tend to under-invest in that consumption. A
tertiary category of benefits, related to both of these, is that of public
health benefits to which HIT adoption and information sharing may sub-
stantially contribute; these benefits are necessarily distributed across the
larger society.
Providers generally capture certain benefits due to improved produc-
tivity. For example, if systems permit them to see more patients or perform
a larger volume of procedures per unit time, the providers themselves are
likely to benefit. Providers are not likely, however, to capture many of the
HIT-enabled benefits of improved patient outcomes or improved public
health . Although reputational assets may be valuable in medicine, pay-
ment and reimbursement arrangements generally do not compensate
providers for improved quality of care. For example, reducing the duplica-
tion of diagnostic tests benefits patients and insurers in the form of lower
payments, less inconvenience, and, with certain testing procedures,
94. Miller, supra note 21, at 224 ("stand-alone provider benefit"); see also CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 20 ("Other benefits, such as lower costs for maintaining
medical records and transcribing clinical data, clearly accrue to the provider who purchases
the health IT system.").
95. Paul Uhfig, Gen. Couns. & Exec. Vice President of Corp. Dev., Chief Privacy Of-
fice, SureScripts, Address at Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Innovations in Health
Care Delivery 181 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/
hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf).
96. Of course, reputational benefits, among others, may accrue to providers that im-
prove their outcomes, but to the extent that the quality and availability of comparative health
care quality information remains poor, such reputational benefits are likely to be muted.
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reduced patient risk." But on average, these social benefits actually re-
duce payments to providers. Further, although Medicare, Medicaid, and
some private insurers have begun to implement limited pay-for-
performance or other quality-based incentive programs, the financial
gains associated with quality improvements are typically modest. By and
large, providers are not compensated for qualitative improvements in
care and limited countervailing programs are unlikely to tip the balance
in favor of HIT investment.
98
Underinvestment due to the inability of providers to capture the full
benefits of their HIT investments could be ameliorated if such
investments were subsidized, which is exactly what the Recovery Act
does. For example, under Medicare, subject to certain constraints and
obligations, eligible health care professionals may be eligible for up to
five years of incentive payments, in amounts decreasing from $15,000-
$18,000 for the first year;99 hospitals may be eligible for incentive
payments over a four year period, beginning with first year payments
that include base payments of $ 2 million.'O Most incentives are
structured to encourage relatively early adoption of interoperable HIT
(and, correspondingly, to discourage failures to adopt).'0 ' In addition,
interspersed throughout the Act are direct and indirect incentives to spur
the development and implementation of HIT through funding initiatives
directed to various other federal agencies and federal grants to and
through the states.'
0 2
97. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 19-20.
98. See id. at 20.
99. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), Pub. L. No.
S11-5, § 4101(a), 123 Stat. 115, 238 (2009) (providing reimbursement amounts varying ac-
cording to the year in which payments begin and a 10% increase for professionals providing
services in designated shortage areas). Hospital-based professionals may be excluded from
such incentive payments under the Section as hospitals separately are eligible for incentive
payments.
100. Such payments begin with a base payment of $2 million in the first year-plus an
amount that varies according to a hospital's number of patient discharges in the payment
year-and decrease progressively each year. Id. § 4102. Varied incentive payments are also
provided for under the Medicaid program. Id.
101. Incentives are in several regards time-sensitive. First, direct financial incentive
payments are not available past a certain threshold: "No incentive payments may be made
under this subsection with respect to a year after 2016." Id. § 4101(a). "If the first payment
year for an eligible professional is after 2014 then the applicable amount ... for such profes-
sional for such year and any subsequent year shall be $0." Id. Furthermore, the statute
provides for certain reductions in scheduled fee payment amounts, for services provided under
Medicare, for an eligible provider who is "not a meaningful EHR user" in 2015 and subse-
quent years. See id. § 4101(b).
102. See, e.g. Recovery Act div. A, tit. I & div. B, tit. VI (directing the Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce and the FCC to expand nationwide broadband service and providing $2.5
billion in grants to the Department of Agriculture for the expansion of high-speed broadband
service in rural communities, both courses being likely to impact access to HIT technology
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For many health care providers, these programs may tip the balance
in favor of HIT adoption. 3 This is, however, a form of industrial plan-
ning on a grand scale and a short clock, and it is unclear whether ARRA
programs are properly calibrated to address the apparent market failure.
Planned subsidies will be adequate, inadequate, or excessive responses
to adoption shortfalls associated with current reimbursement policies.
Additional barriers to HIT, or costs associated with its adoption, in-
clude, among others, regulatory costs and network effects, which we
discuss below.
C. Federal and State Health Information Privacy
and Data Security Law
Three primary sources of privacy regulation apply to HIT. First,
HHS administers HIPAA and its associated Privacy and Data Security
Rules. Second, the FTC enforces the FTC Act against entities that fail to
safeguard sensitive information. Finally, states have their own privacy
and data security laws. Additional regulation is emerging under the
Recovery Act."
1. HIPAA
Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996, in part for the purpose of
improving "the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system, by
encouraging the development of a health information system through the
nationwide); see also id. at div. A, tit. II (providing $4.7 billion in grants to expand broadband
technology in order to increase, among other things, public access to computer technology,
which will broaden access to HIT); id. at div. A, tit. VII (providing $85 million to Indian
Health Services and $415 million toward improving Indian Health Facilities; portions of each
will involve purchasing equipment that will improve access to HIT); id. at div. A, tit. VIII
(providing $1 billion to the National Center for Research Resources to renovate and repair
non-federal research facilities, some which will require upgrades for HIT); id. (providing the
Agency for HealthCare Research and Quality with $700 million for comparative effectiveness
research, with a portion likely to be targeted at price and quality transparency and/or HIT-
related research).
103. It should also be anticipated that such programs will have an effect on private de-
velopment of HIT applications and services. For example, it was recently reported that Wal-
Mart intends to market electronic health records to physicians in small office practices. See
Steve Lohr, Wal-Mart to Digitize Health Data, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. II, 2009, at B I.
104. See, e.g., FTC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 74 Fed. Reg. 17,914 (April 20,
2009) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 318) (proposed rule under Recovery Act); see also Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., Guidance Specifying the Technologies and Methodologies That
Render Protected Health Information Unusable, Unreadable, or Indecipherable to Unauthor-
ized Individuals for Purposes of the Breach Notification Requirements Under Section 13402
of Title XIII (Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act) of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 19,006 (Apr. 27, 2009) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164).
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establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic
transmission of certain health information."' ' Among other things,
HIPAA and its implementing regulations provide certain assurances to
individual health care consumers about the privacy of their medical
informationi °6
The Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA '° have led
HHS to promulgate a suite of rules,' ° with one, the Standards for Privacy
of Individually Identifiable Health Information (the Privacy Rule or the
Rule), bearing particular significance for privacy concerns associated
with HIT.'°9 The Privacy Rule applies to protected health information
(PHI), which is individually-identifiable health information that is "held
or transmitted by a covered entity or its business associate, in any form
or media, whether electronic, paper, or oral.""0 HHS also promulgated a
rule concerning security standards (the Security Rule), which requires
reasonable and appropriate administrative, physical, and technological
safeguards to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of PHI that is in
electronic form.'" The Security Rule complements the Privacy Rule:
among other things, certain elements of data security may be viewed as
105. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1302d note (2008).
106. In particular, the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides those assurances to individual hu-
man persons who are the end-consumers of health care. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2002)
("Individual means the person who is the subject of protected health information.").
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d.
108. HHS has promulgated the Privacy Rule, the Transactions and Code Sets Rule, the
Security Rule, Unique Identifiers Rules, and the Enforcement Rule.
109. The Privacy Rule initially was promulgated in December 2000. See Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, Final
Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000). It became effective in April 2001. See Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Informa-
tion, Final Rule; Correction of Effective and Compliance Dates, 66 Fed. Reg. 12,434 (Feb. 26,
2001). Modifications to the Rule were published in the Federal Register in August 2002 and
became effective in October of that year. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Standards for
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug.
14, 2002). The Privacy Rule is codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164. It should be noted that the
compliance date for most covered entities under the rule was not until April 14, 2003. 45
C.F.R. § 164.534 (2010).
110. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OCR PRIVACY BRIEF: SUMMARY OF THE
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 3 (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/
understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf. [hereinafter HHS PRIVACY RULE SUMM.]. For
regulatory definitions of health information, individually identifiable health information, and
protected health information, see 45 C.F.R. § 164.103 (2003).
Ill. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, Final Rule ("The HIPAA Security
Rule"), 68 Fed. Reg. 8,334 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 and Subparts A and
C of pt. 164). HHS promulgated the Security Rule, like the Privacy Rule, to implement certain
HIPAA statutory provisions, with enforcement of the Privacy Rule being chiefly the responsi-
bility of the HHS Office of Civil Rights (OCR) and enforcement of the Security Rule being
chiefly the responsibility of CMS.
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implementations of privacy policies codified in HIPAA and the Privacy
Rule.
Several features of HIPAA are especially salient to the present dis-
cussion. First, the Privacy Rule establishes circumstances in which use
or disclosure by a covered entity or business associate is permitted."
2
Covered entities generally may use or disclose PHI, without authoriza-
tion, as follows: (1) to the individual subject of that information; (2) for
treatment, payment, and health care operations; (3) incident to an other-
wise permitted use and disclosure; (4) for certain public interest and
benefit activities; and (5) as limited data sets for research, health care
operations, or public health purposes."3 Second, when use or disclosure
of information is not expressly permitted, a covered entity generally
must obtain written authorization from the individual prior to such use or
disclosure. ' 4 Third, HIPAA and the Rule establish a federal floor of pro-
tection for individually-identifiable health information, at least with
regard to covered entities, ''5 in general, leaving the states free to adopt
more stringent protections for consumers than those guaranteed under
federal law.
The Recovery Act generally maintains HIPAA's privacy and data se-
curity requirements, to the extent that they are consistent with pertinent
provisions of the Recovery Act itself,"6 as well as HHS authority under
HIPAA." 7 In addition, the Recovery Act expands upon consumer privacy
protections already contemplated under HIPAA. For example, under
HIPAA, business associates of covered entities were subject chiefly to
indirect regulation: covered entities were required to impose certain con-
tractual limits on the use and disclosure of PHI by their business
associates, but those limits were not generally subject to HHS enforce-
ment or to private actions by the individual health care consumers whose
PHI might be at issue but who were not themselves in privity with the
business associates.' 8 The Recovery Act provides for the direct
112. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1) (2008).
113. Id. at 164.502(a)(1) (2008); DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OCR PRIVACY
BRIEF: SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummarypdf. [hereinafter HHS PRIVACY
RULE SUMM.].
114. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2002).
115. HHS PRIVACY RULE SUMM., supra note 113, at 1-2.
116. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 13421, 123 Stat. 115, 238 (2009).
117. Id. § 3009(a).
118. This had been identified as one of the significant "gaps" in HIPAA coverage by
panelists at the FTC Workshop and other commentators. See Susan McAndrew, Deputy Dir.
for Health Info. Privacy, HHS Office of Civil Rights, Address at Federal Trade Commission
Workshop on Innovations in Health Care Delivery 211 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.govlbc/healthcare/hcd/docslhcdwksptranscript.pdf) (regarding "certain gaps in
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application of certain security and privacy provisions to parties that, un-
der HIPAA, are business associates of covered entities. ' '9 The Recovery
Act also regulates the use and disclosure of PHI by certain non-HIPAA-
covered entities, such as vendors of PHRs and third parties that offer
products or services through the web sites of vendors of PHRs.'2°
2. The FTC Act
A provider can violate the FTC Act's prohibition on deceptive acts
by making false or misleading promises to patients that it will safeguard
their data. Additionally, a provider can violate Section 5 of the FTC Act
by failing to take reasonable steps to safeguard patients' data that cause,
or are likely to cause, significant consumer harm. 2 ' Since 2001, the FTC
has obtained twenty-two consent orders against companies that alleg-
edly failed to provide reasonable protections for sensitive consumer
information in violation of Section 5 .22
In 2002, for example, Eli Lilly allegedly released the names and e-
mail addresses of more than 650 individual Prozac consumers, who had
voluntarily registered, via a Lilly web site, to receive prescription refill
reminders.'23 Because the disclosures appeared to violate Lilly's own
published privacy and data security assurances 24 to the detriment of the
consumers who had registered with Lilly under that policy, the disclo-
sures prompted an FTC investigation. That investigation concluded with
a settlement, including a consent order that prohibits false or misleading
privacy statements and commits the company to implement certain pri-
vacy protections going forward. '2 More recently, CVS Caremark agreed
to settle charges that it had failed, in violation of the FTC Act, to take
the current HIPAA coverage"); Pritts, supra note 86, at 289 (describing "gaps" in federal and
state privacy protections as difficult to identify and needs for consumer control and trust not
being met).
119. Recovery Act §§ 13401, 13404 (outlining application of security provisions and
penalties and application of privacy provisions and penalties, respectively).
120. Id. § 13407. Treatment of PHR-related entities also has been identified as a gap in
HIPAA coverage. McGraw, supra note 31, at 146-47 (regarding "gaps" in HIPAA coverage,
especially with regard to personal health records).
121. See In re CVS Caremark Corp., F.T.C. File No. 072-3119, Comp. (February 18,
2009).
122. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Navone, No. 2:08-CV-01842 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2008); U.S. v.
ValueClick, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-01711 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2008): In re Eli Lilly & Co., F.T.C.
Docket No. C-4047 (May 8, 2002).
123. Press Release, ET.C., Eli Lilly Settles FTC Charges Concerning Security Breach
(Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opal2002/0 I /elililly.htm.
124. Id.
125. hi re Eli Lilly & Co., File No. 012 3214, Agreement Containing Consent Order
(Jan. 18, 2002), available at http:lwww.ftc.govlos/202101/lillyagree.pdf; see also In re Eli
Lilly & Co., File No. 012 3214, Decision and Order (May 10, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillydo.htm.
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reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect sensitive finan-
cial and medical information of its customers and employees.'
26
The Recovery Act has given the FTC more specific responsibility in
the HIT privacy arena, particularly in its breach notification provisions.
One set of ARRA breach notification requirements-to be enforced by
HHS-pertains to HIPAA-covered entities such as health care providers;
another-to be enforced by the FTC-pertains to certain non-HIPAA-
covered entities, such as vendors of PHRs and their affiliated third-party
service providers.'2 7 Vendors of PHRs and related entities that discover
certain PHI security breaches are required to notify both the FTC and the
consumer whose PHI was breached.'28
3. State Law
A substantial body of state regulation exists regarding the privacy
and security of consumer health information. 2 9 As we have said, HIPAA
and the Privacy Rule establish a federal floor of protection for individu-
ally-identifiable health information, at least with regard to covered
entities, leaving the states free to adopt more stringent protections for
consumers than those guaranteed under federal law.'3° As a result, "states
126. CVS Caremark, F.T.C. File No. 072-3119 (claiming that respondent allegedly "dis-
carded materials containing personal information in clear readable text (such as prescriptions,
prescription bottles, pharmacy labels, computer printouts, prescription purchase refunds, credit
card receipts, and employee records) in unsecured, publicly-accessible trash dumpsters on
numerous occasions"). CVS Caremark independently agreed to pay $2.25 million to resolve
HHS allegations that it violated HIPAA. Id.
127. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), Pub. L. No.
I 11-5, § 13407, 123 Stat. 115,238 (2009).
128. The FTC is required to notify HHS in turn. The requirements pertain to "(i) vendors
of personal health records; (ii) entities that offer products or services through the website of a
vendor of personal health records; (iii) entities that are not covered entities and that offer
products or services through the websites of covered entities that offer individuals personal
health records; (iv) entities that are not covered entities and that access information in a per-
sonal health record or send information to a personal health record; and (v) third party service
providers used by a vendor or entity described in clause (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) to assist in provid-
ing personal health record products or services" (incorporating entities described under the
Recovery Act § 13424(b)(I)(A) by reference). The section also requires the FTC to promul-
gate certain interim final regulations to enforce this provision. Id. § 13424; see also F.T.C.,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Public Comment, re 16 C.F.R. Pt. 318, Health
Breach Notification Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 17,914 (Apr. 20, 2009).
129. See generally, e.g., Dimitropoulos & Rizk, supra note 14, at 428-29 (issues in ac-
commodating state-level variation); NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-3. For a general
overview of state law provisions, see INST. FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH & POLICY, GEORGE-
TOWN UNIV., JOY L. PRITTS ET AL., THE STATE OF HEALTH PRIVACY: A SURVEY OF STATE
HEALTH PRIVACY (2d ed. 2003), available at http://hpi.georgetown.edu/privacy/pdfs/
statereport2.pdf (last visited March 31, 2010) [hereinafter PRITTS ET AL., 2003] (summarizing
health privacy statutes circa 2002 for all fifty states plus District of Columbia).
130. Congress intended for HIPAA to serve as a federally-mandated floor of protection
for PHI, rather than a ceiling. Accordingly, state legislatures can further regulate the use and
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have a wide variety of protections for personal health information. Some
are at, or very close to, the floor of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, while oth-
ers impose much more restrictive measures."'"' Although it sometimes
may be difficult to determine which jurisdiction's requirements are more
stringent, the Privacy Rule does provide some guidance in that regard.'1
2
In that context, many states have maintained health privacy protec-
tions in the wake of HIPAA, with the particulars varying substantially
from state to state.' Some states have reduced the scope of their own
health information privacy and security regulation, some have sought to
recapitulate federal protections, and some have increased the scope or
strength of their regulations. '- States regulate, among other things, pro-
cedural access provisions, condition-specific disclosure rules, and causes
of action for access and disclosure violations.'3 States may also establish
forms of physician-patient privilege, general rights of health privacy,
and the assignment of property rights in medical files to patients. Privacy
and data security remain active areas of state regulatory activity, and
several states have taken recent steps to make their regulations regarding
disclosure of PHI. 67 Fed. Reg. at 53,182. In general, state laws that are contrary to the
HIPAA Privacy Rule are preempted by the federal requirements. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203. A state
law is "contrary" to the Privacy Rule if it would be impossible to comply with both the state
and federal requirements, or if the state law is an obstacle to accomplishing the full purposes
and objectives of the Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202.
However, if a provision of state law is more stringent than a provision of the Privacy Rule, and
it is possible to comply with both the state law and the Privacy Rule, there is no conflict be-
tween the state law and the Privacy Rule and no preemption.
131. NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-13.
132. A state law is "more stringent" if it, among other things, further restricts a use or
disclosure otherwise permitted under the Privacy Rule, "provides greater privacy protection
for the individual who is the subject of the [PHI]," or provides the individual health care con-
sumer with either a greater right of access to her PHI or a more detailed accounting of use and
disclosure of her PHI. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202. The 4th Circuit has upheld HIPAA's non-
preemption provision against claims that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment for vagueness, finding that, although the "criteria will doubtless call for covered
entities to make some common sense evaluations and comparisons between state and federal
laws, [it] does not mean they are either vague or constitutionally infirm." South Carolina Med.
Ass'n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346, 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
133. See generally, e.g., Dimitropoulos & Rizk, supra note 14; PRIT'S ET AL., 2003,
supra note 129.
134. See Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the
Federal Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POCY L. & ETHICS 325, 345-47 (2002)
(reviewing state policy changes since HIPAA generally and comparing, e.g., Hawaii, which
repealed its state health privacy statute in response to the Rule, and Texas, which "adopted a
broad health privacy statute that both mirrors and expands upon the Federal Health Privacy
Rule").
135. See generally id.
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medical privacy and data security more stringent. For example, Califor-
nia enacted two pieces of health information legislation in 2008.36
Other states have adopted general regulations on personally identifi-
able information that sweep broadly enough to have implications for
HIT entities. For example, Massachusetts adopted "Standards for the
Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth,"
which "apply to all persons that own, license, store or maintain personal
information about a resident of the Commonwealth.' 37
Many state law provisions revisit or replicate federal standards. For
example, federal law generally provides individual health care con-
sumers with certain rights of access to their medical records, requiring
that health care providers furnish such access within 30 or 60 days,
depending on the particulars of the consumer request.'3 8 Certain states
have adopted requirements that mirror the federal 30 and 60-day re-
sponse times.' 39 Other states provide for rights of access, but require
that health care providers act more quickly than required under federal
law.' 40 Still other states provide for access to medical records under
more particular circumstances, such as telemedicine' 4' or ambulance
136. See generally Assemb. Bill 211, An Act to Amend § 56.36 of the CAL. CIv. CODE,
and to Add Division 109 (Commencing with § 130200) to the CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Code,
Relating to Health (approved by Governor Sept. 30, 2008); Senate Bill No. 541, An Act to
Amend §§ 1280.1 and 1280.3 of, and to Add § 1280.15 to, the CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE,
Relating to Health Facilities (approved by Governor Sept. 30, 2008). Among other things,
these (a) require health care providers and other entities to adopt safeguards against the unau-
thorized disclosure of consumer health records, Ca. A.B. 211 § 2 (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 130203(a)), (b) make certain violations of medical privacy punishable as misdemean-
ors, establishing private and public remedies for unauthorized disclosures, including private
rights of action, administrative fines, and civil penalties, id. § I (CAL. CiV. CODE § 56.36(a)-
(c)) and Cal. S.B. No. 541 §§ 1-3 (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1280.1, 1280.15, &
1280.3), and (c) require prompt reporting of unauthorized disclosures of protected health in-
formation to both the state and the individual consumers whose information is disclosed, Cal.
S.B. No. 541 § 2 (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1280.15(b)(l)-(2)).
137. 201 C.M.R. §§ 17.00-17.01. Section 17.01 regards purpose and scope.
138. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(b)(2).
139. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2001(e) (2008).
140. For example, South Carolina law allows 45 days for the requisite disclosures, while
Maryland only allows 21, Louisiana, among others, allows 15, Wyoming allows 10, and Cali-
foria allows as few as 5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-325 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.
§ 4-309(a) (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.96 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-2-611
(2008); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123110, 123130 (2007). See also WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.02.080 (2008) & TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 241.154 (2007) (addi-
tional state statutes requiring disclosure within 15 days).
141. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123149.5 (2007) (telemedicine data included
in a patient's medical record); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-801(d)(4) (2007) (telemedicine data
included in a patient's medical record); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 6804 (2008) (requiring provid-
ers to give telemedicine patients: "A statement that patient access to all medical information
transmitted during a telemedicine interaction is guaranteed, and that copies of this information
are available at stated costs, which shall not exceed the direct cost of providing the copies
....).
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services,142 or provide specific timetables for insurers.4 1 On the other
hand, at least one state has repealed pre-HIPAA legislation limiting con-
sumer access to avoid conflict with the Privacy Rule.'"
Some states regulate the disclosure of particular types of health in-
formation. For example, many states mandate the confidentiality of
sensitive medical conditions documented in government registries of
birth defects, cancer, genetic testing, chronic disease, mental health, ve-
nereal diseases, and HIV/AIDS.'4 4 A few states have enacted more
particular or distinctive restrictions: the District of Columbia has a spe-
cial statute protecting records of child abuse, Illinois protects
information stored in a registry for spinal cord injuries, and Texas pro-
tects information stored in a registry of Agent Orange Victims. '
46
Although HIPAA provides HHS with the authority to enforce pri-
vacy regulations through civil money penalties,4 neither the statute nor
the Privacy Rule excludes other forms of legal action under other bodies
of U.S. law, and some states provide for private causes of action related
to health information privacy. Under these state laws, patients may pur-
sue civil actions against health care providers or insurers for access and
disclosure violations, with a wide range of possible remedies and differ-
ing statutes of limitations.'4 California, Connecticut, Maryland,
Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming are a few states that support causes of action for a failure to
142. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-2291 (2008) (ambulance services).
143. Several states require that insurers respond to consumer requests to amend medical
records within 30 days. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1010 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
24-A, § 2210(i) (2008); MINN. STAT. § 2A.498 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:23A-9 (2008);
OR. REV. STAT. § 746.645 (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 610.70(3)(a) (2007); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 3904.09 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-39-50 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-39-10(a)(l).
144. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-618 (2008) (bringing state law into compliance with
HIPAA through its enactment in 2003, by repealing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-25 (1971),
which required a patient's attorney to present written and notarized authorization to a hospital
before a patient could gain access to medical records).
145. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-1 (2008) ("All information, interviews,
reports, statements, memoranda, or other data procured by the department of health ... for the
purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality shall be strictly confidential ...."); id. § 34-22-
12.1 (communicable diseases including HIV); id. § 34-14-22 (predictive genetic testing); id.
§ 27A-l 2-26 (mental health services); id. § 34-23-2 (venereal diseases); id. 34-20A-90 (alco-
hol and drug abuse treatment facilities).
146. D.C. CODE § 4-1302.01 (2008); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 515/3 (2008); TEx. HEALTH
& SAFETY §§ 83.002-83.005 (2007).
147. 45 C.F.R. § 160.418 (except as otherwise provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(b)(I);
civil penalty by HHS is not exclusive).
148. For example, under California law, an individual "may bring an action against any
person or entity who has negligently released confidential information or records concerning
him or her ... for either or both of the following: (I) Nominal damages of one thousand dol-
lars . .. [and] (2) The amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the patient." Cal.
Assemb. Bill 211 § I (CAL. Civ. CODE § 56.36(a)).
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provide access to patient records.' 49 Rhode Island, among others, pro-
vides patients with the right to sue an insurer for unlawful disclosure of
medical information.'
5
A few states have created additional protections and a generalized
privacy right in medical records through a "patient bill of rights.' 5', Most
states uphold some version of physician-patient privilege in court, but a
few have especially narrow constructions of the privilege or none at
all.'" Although the more general rule is that medical files belong to the
health care provider that compiles or holds them,'" New Hampshire law
assigns property rights in the files to the consumers represented in those
files.'4
149. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123120 (2007) (equitable relief with costs and
attorneys fees); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-995 (2008) (equitable relief against insurance com-
pany with costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 4-309(f) (2008) (liability for actual damages); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-
553 (2007) (liability for pecuniary losses and reasonable attorneys fees under a three-year
statute of limitations); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:30 (2008) (equitable relief for violation);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.74(C) (2008) (action to enforce the patient's right of access);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.02.170 (2008) (liability for actual damages (but not consequential or
incidental damages) reasonable attorneys' fees and all other expenses reasonably incurred to
the prevailing party under a two-year statute of limitations); W. VA. CODE § 16-29-1(e) (2008)
(attorney fees and costs, including court costs); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-2-616 (2008) (equita-
ble relief plus liability for pecuniary losses sustained as a result of the violation and
reasonable attorneys fees under a two-year statute of limitations).
150. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4(a)(1) (2008) (providing a cause of action with actual
and punitive damages for release of a patient's confidential health care information without
authorization).
151. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § lB (2008) (right of privacy and remedy to en-
force); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1502 (2010) (right to privacy for care received at a health
care facility); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03 (2010) ("right of privacy in the content of his
health records"); FLA. STAT. § 381.026(4) (2008) (Florida Patient's Bill of Rights and Respon-
sibilities); MINN. STAT. § 144.651 (2009) (Health Care Bill of Rights).
152. See, e.g., Solomon v. State Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance, 155 Md. App. 687,
703-04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) ("[C]ommunications made to a physician in his profes-
sional capacity by a patient are neither privileged under the common law of Maryland, nor
have they been made so by statute.") (quoting Butler-Tulio v. Scroggins, 774 A.2d 1209, (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2001), cert. denied, 366 Md. 247, 783 A.2d 221 (2001)); Commonwealth v.
Senior, 744 N.E.2d 614, 617 (Mass. 2001) (finding no statutory patient-physician testimonial
privilege in Massachusetts); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) ("The
physician-patient evidentiary privilege is unknown to the common law. In States where it
exists by legislative enactment, it is subject to many exceptions and to waiver for many rea-
sons.").
153. See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03 (2008). See generally Steven M. Harris,
Make Sure You Own Your Patients' Medical Records, AMNEws, Nov. 4, 2002, http://
www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2002/1 1/04/bical 104.htm.
154. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-1:1 (2008) ("All medical information contained in the
medical records in the possession of any health care provider shall be deemed to be the prop-
erty of the patient.").
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Finally, courts in a number of states have recognized common law
rights and responsibilities pertaining to medical privacy, ' including
physician obligations to treat patient records in confidence.5 6 At the
same time, several state courts have read such rights or obligations nar-
rowly or have repudiated them altogether.'17 For example, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland has held that "there is no testimonial phy-




II. NETWORK EFFECTS IN HIT
In some industries, consumers' valuation of a product increases as
others use the product as well. "9 For example, the benefit a consumer
may derive from the telephone or the Internet depends on the number of
others using the network.'6" In this manner, consumers of network goods
fail to capture the full benefit of their consumption. Correspondingly,
consumers may tend to under-consume such network goods. 6 ' Network
effects are so-called as they have long been observed in industries de-
pendent on physical networks, such as the telephone network.' 2 In
addition, they typically arise in industries, such as the computer industry,
that depend on the provision of a durable good (e.g., a computer) and a
complementary good or service (e.g., software).'6 3 In the abstract, HIT
generally fits at least the second model and interoperable HIT fits the
first as well.
The presence of network effects in an industry may have implica-
tions not just for individual consumer preferences, but also for
development, production, and competition among producers or vendors.
155. For a general discussion of these state common law issues, see Pritts 2002, supra
note 133, at 325, 330-32.
156. "Individuals have a right to and an expectation of privacy related to their medical
information, and this fight and expectation of privacy is reflected in our public policy." Coy v.
Wash. County Hosp. Dist., 372 11. App. 3d 1077, 1083 (111. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2007).
157. Pritts 2002, supra note 133, at 33 1.
158. See Solomon v. State Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance, 155 Md. App. 687, 703
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
159. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Com-
patibility, 75 Am. EcON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) ("There are many products for which the utility
that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents
consuming the good.").
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of
Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 822, 825 (1986).
162. See, e.g., id. at 823 (citing Dennis W. Carlton & J. Mark Klamer, The Need for
Coordination Among Firms, with Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
446 (1983) and others).
163. Id.
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For example, network effects may be associated with excess inertia, path
dependence, or a tendency toward monopoly in certain industries. Net-
work effects are not necessarily barriers or impediments to competition.
Still, with such goods (or in such industries), there may be special sig-
nificance to consumer expectations (about, e.g., future development and
consumption), '6 and there may be a bias towards underinvestment, as
consumers anticipate failing to capture the full benefits of their own con-
sumption.' 61 In addition, where products (or networks) offered by
different firms are incompatible with each other, "the firms' joint incen-
tives for product compatibility are lower than the social benefits."'
6
Network effects may bear on product development and introduction
6
1
and pricing'" as well.
Network effects associated with HIT adoption thus may raise various
policy issues, as HIT appears to exhibit characteristics of network indus-
tries.' 69 For example, as noted in a recent CBO Report, "Providers who
can perform functions electronically (such as communicating with each
other, sending and receiving medical records, prescribing medications
electronically, and ordering laboratory and imaging procedures) gain
when other providers develop similar [compatible or interoperable] elec-
tronic capabilities."'70 Further, there is some empirical evidence that HIT
is subject to network effects. Specifically, Miller and Tucker have ob-
served local network effects in HIT adoption, finding a robust and
positive relationship between the installed base of hospital HIT in a
given local health service area and the likelihood of adoption by addi-
tional hospitals.' That is, generally, the more hospital HIT there is in a
164. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities,
40 J. INous. EcON. 55, 74 (1992).
165. See generally, e.g., Katz & Carl, supra note 159.
166. Id. at 425. At the same time, firms may have too much incentive to agree on com-
patibility if it will increase the costs of production. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Product Compatibility Choice in a Market with Technological Progress, 38 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 146 (1986).
167. See, e.g., Katz & Shapiro, supra note 164; Jay Pil Choi, Irreversible Choice of Un-
certain Technologies with Network Externalities, 25 RAND J. EcoN. 382 (1994); Eirik G.
Kristiansen, R&D in the Presence of Network Externalities: iming and Compatibility, 29
RAND J. ECON. 531 (1998).
168. Kristiansen, supra note 167; cf Nicholas Economides, Desirability of Compatibility
in the Absence of Network Externalities, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 1165, 1165-66 (1989) (stating
that equilibrium prices and profits tend to be higher with compatibility, even ruling out "posi-
tive consumption externalities . .. that would naturally lead to similar conclusions").
169. See Miller & Tucker, supra note 12, at 21 (estimating the average network effect in
states without strong state privacy laws, in addition to federal laws, to be about 6%).
170. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 20.
171. Miller, supra note 21, at 231 (estimating the network effect in states without strong
privacy laws to be about 6%).
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service area, the more likely it is that additional hospitals in the area will
adopt HIT.'
71
These network effects, however, are contingent on the extent of pri-
vacy regulation in a given state. In fact, these effects are observed to
disappear entirely in states that apply certain consent requirements to
hospitals. 73 In addition, because they tend to suppress the local network
benefits associated with hospital eHR adoption, these state laws are as-
sociated with lower rates-up to 25% lower-of HIT adoption.' 74 The
data also suggest that hospitals adopting eMRs in states with privacy
protections are more likely to adopt proprietary, closed systems than
open or interoperable ones. 7 Network effects in HIT, therefore, raise a
balancing issue, as certain state law privacy provisions appear to sup-
press network benefits associated with HIT adoption but may serve other
social interests.
Standard setting issues also may be implicated in such network in-
dustries. Standard setting-private, public, or some public/private
hybrid-can be pro-competitive under a wide variety of circumstances,
perhaps ameliorating coordination problems in network industries. 76 In
HIT, such coordination problems may be addressed by standards cover-
ing physical qualities of hardware, architectural or formatting aspects of
applications or systems, or substantive policy commitments for informa-
tion handling.'
77
172. See id. As explained below, this effect is observed across states that have not
adopted certain privacy regulations, pertaining to hospital sharing of health information, above
the federal floor established by HIPAA, the federal Privacy Rule, and other federal laws. Also
explained below is that this positive network effect essentially disappears in states that have
adopted such hospital health privacy laws above the federal floor.
173. Miller, supra note 21, at 231. Most of the data presented by Miller was collected
prior to HHS' adoption of the Privacy Rule, so absent state law, there were no privacy laws
applying to hospitals.
174. Miller & Tucker, supra note 12, at I; Miller, supra note 21, at 231.
175. Miller, supra note 21, at 232.
176. For example, standard setting can help to "avoid many of the costs and delays of a
standards war," in which substitute but incompatible products seek to become dominant, or a
defacto standard. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & F.T.C., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 34-35 (2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/PO40101 PromotinglnnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.p
df (recognizing potential benefits of standard setting, while noting possible competitive con-
cerns, such as manipulation of the standard-setting process). It has also been observed that
standard setting can clear "patent thickets" that may impede the development of follow-on
products, especially in certain IT industries. See F.T.C., To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 152 (Oct. 2003), available
at http:llwww.ftc.gov/osl200311Olinnovationrpt.pdf.
177. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 81, at 181-82; Dente, supra note 50, at 278; Ferguson,
supra note 25, at 140; Kolodner, supra note 34, at 267-68; Tony Trenkle, Dir., Office of E-
Health Standards & Servs. at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep't of Health &
Human Services, Address at Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Innovations in Health
Care Delivery 282-83 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
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In fact, many stakeholders have identified a lack of standards as a
barrier to HIT adoption;'7 8 not incidentally, various standard-setting ef-
forts are underway. Although many standards are voluntary, others-
such as CMS standards for eRx promulgated under the Medicare
Modernization Act9-have the force of law.'80 HHS also has helped
foster certification standards and processes for HIT products.'8 ' HHS
involvement in standard setting continues under the Recovery Act. For
example, the Act establishes an HIT Standards Committee "to recom-
mend to the National Coordinator standards, implementation
specification, and certification criteria for the electronic exchange and
use of health information for the purposes of adoption" of nationally
recognized standards for HIT.'8 2 ARRA standard setting is underway. In
January 2010, CMS published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
to define the "meaningful use" of eHR technology and provide incentive
healthcare/hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf). But cf Letter from Stephen Downs, Robert Wood
Johnson Found., David Lansky, Markle Found., JP Little, RxHub, Steve Shihadeh, Microsoft
& MyrI Weinberg, Nat'l Health Council, to Hon. Michael 0. Leavitt, Sec'y, Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., and Chairman, A.H.I.C., Dissenting Statement on PHR Certification Process
(Mar. 13, 2007) (on file with author) (suggesting that the certification process for PHRs would
likely stifle innovation and that these risks outweigh the benefits); David C. Kibbe & Curtis P.
McLaughlin, The Alternative Route: Hanging Out the Unmentionables for Better Decision
Making in Health Information Technology, HEALTH AFF. w396, w396 (2008), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.27.5.w396v I ("[R]elying on established
industry experts has left us with a standards process that is complex and burdened by diverse
goals, easy for entrenched interests to dominate, and reluctant to deal with potentially disrup-
tive technologies.").
178. See Ferguson, supra note 25, at 139 ("[I]nteroperability is certainly a requirement
to make HIT go.").
179. See 42 C.F.R. § 423.160 (standards for electronic prescribing); see also Trenkle,
supra note 177, at 283.
180. In addition, under the 2006 Executive Order, "As each agency implements,
acquires, or upgrades health information technology systems used for the direct exchange of
health information between agencies and with non-Federal entities, it shall utilize, where
available, health information technology systems and products that meet recognized
interoperability standards." Exec. Order No. 13,410, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,089 (Aug. 28, 2006)
[hereinafter 2006 Exec. Order]. Such interoperability standards are those recognized as such
by the Secretary of HHS. Id.
181. See, e.g., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Health IT Certification, available at
http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt?open=512&mode=2&cached=true&objlD=1 196&Page
ID=15507 (last visited April I, 2010). A list of certified products is available at http:/
www.cchit.org/products (last visited April I, 2010).
182. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 3003(a), 123 Stat. 115, 238 (2009). The ONC must adopt an initial set of standards
by the end of 2009. § 3004(b)(1). However, the Recovery Act will not require private entities
to comply with those standards. § 3006(a). The ONC also must develop and make available to
providers "qualified electronic health record technology" unless HHS determines that the
marketplace is "substantially and adequately" meeting "the needs and demands" of providers.
§ 3007(a).
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payments for the meaningful use of certified eHRs.'8 At the same time,
HHS published an interim final rule and a request for comments regard-
ing an Initial Set of Standards, Implementation Specifications, and
Certification Criteria for eHRs.'8
In some circumstances, however, standard setting can raise competi-
tion issues. As Carlton and Klamer have put the general problem,
"[c]oordination among firms presents a policy dilemma. Efficiency may
require coordinated action, but coordinated action can stifle competition
and make collusion more likely."'85 Excessive standard setting may con-
strain innovation, just as appropriate standard setting may further it.
Where products are incompatible, "a government agency that has the
authority to impose one of the products as a mandatory standard may
intervene to prevent inefficient stranding of earlier buyers."''86 Such stan-
dard-setting, however, may itself be socially harmful as it may induce an
inefficient R&D race.1
87
Although government standard setting may speed HIT adoption by
lessening coordination problems, some commentators have suggested
that the emphasis on standard setting in HIT has been excessive and that
excessive or premature standard setting may be counter-productive for
HIT development.' 88 In particular, some commentators have criticized
standard setting for PHRs, arguing that it is "likely to ... stifle innova-
tion by prematurely locking in current approaches to PHRs and deterring
new entrants in a field that is newly developing."'89
Bracketing questions of net effects, it is important to note that HHS
recognition of standards can have a tremendous impact, whether stan-
dards are required under regulation or endorsed in a less formal
183. Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 1843 (proposed Jan. 13,
2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412-13, 422, 495).
184. Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, Implementation Specifica-
tions, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record Technology, 75 Fed. Reg. 2013
(interim final rule published Jan. 13, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170).
185. Dennis W. Carlton & J. Mark Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms,
with Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. CM. L. REv. 446 (1983).
186. Eirik G. Kristiansen, R&D in the Presence of Network Externalities: Tuming and
Compatibility, 29 RAND J. ECON. 531, 542 (1998).
187. Id. at 533 (citing J. Farrell & G. Saloner, Converters, Compatibility, and the Control
of Interfaces, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 9 (1992) (discussing that ex post standardization in the con-
text of converters can give rise to inefficient incentives to produce compatible technologies)).
188. See, e.g., Carol C. Diamond & Clay Shirky, Health Information Technology: A Few
Years of Magical Thinking?, HEALTH AFF. w383, w386 (2008), available at http:Il
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.27.5.w383vl; see also Kibbe & McLaughlin, su-
pra note 177. But cf Kolodner et al., supra note 36, at w394 ("There is an approach that
allows technology choices to proceed so that progress can continue as rapidly as possible
without limiting future policy choices.").
189. Downs et al., supra note 177, at I.
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fashion.'90 In either case, policy makers should at least be aware of this
second set of balancing issues in HIT.
III. PRIVACY PREFERENCES AND TRADE-OFFS
A. Consumer Preferences for Privacy
Many consumers are anxious about the privacy of electronic medical
records, and these concerns may tend to slow HIT adoption. For exam-
ple, survey data indicate that consumers avoid HIT utilities, such as
PHRs, if they do not trust the privacy or data security provisions attached
to those utilities.' 9' The same data suggest that the privacy and data secu-
rity policies that vendors adopt are important to many consumers
considering the use of HIT, with the greatest percentage concerned about
notification should there be unauthorized disclosure of their health in-
formation. 92 Further, consumers who worry about medical privacy may
be less likely to insist that their providers adopt HIT.'9" Given these
background concerns, reports of privacy or security failures can under-
mine consumer trust in HIT.'94
In addition, consumers who are concerned about health information
privacy may engage in "privacy protective behavior"-seeking to safe-
guard their health information by withholding information from their
providers, paying out-of-pocket for covered care, or simply avoiding
treatment altogether. '9 Indeed, the ARRA recognizes this risk, tasking
190. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 25, at 180 (describing the great strides made in the
last few years attributed to ONC standard-setting initiatives that have "fundamentally changed
the marketplace").
191. MARKLE FOUND., supra note 86, at 3 (Westin and Knowledge Networks national
survey) (indicating that 56.8% of those consumers "not interested" in PHRs cite privacy and
confidentiality concems as key); (f, McGraw, supra note 31, at 143 (discussing that not hav-
ing appropriate protections in place deepens consumer distrust and can create a "chilling
effect").
192. MARKLE FOUND., supra note 86, at 3 (indicating that 60% of consumers say notifi-
cation would be "essential," 32% "a factor," and 8% "nice").
193. See McGraw, supra note 31, at 143; cf Uhrig, supra note 95, at 179 (suggesting
that patient education will increase interest in HIT).
194. See, e.g., McGraw, supra note 31, at 143 (stating that news of privacy failures "cre-
ates chilling effect that keeps people from trusting in these systems"); Kolodner, supra note
34, at 269 (discussing the importance of building trust in the privacy and security of a net-
work); Pritts, supra note 86, at 289 (discussing consumer "needs for privacy and control and
trust"); cf Scriban, supra note 31, at 246 (describing various "trust decision[s]" consumers
make in authorizing access to their Health Vault (PHR) records); Pritts, supra note 86, at 289
(discussing the difficulty for consumers to know what conduct may be covered by various
bodies of law or subject to redress).
195. McGraw, supra note 3 1, at 142; Pritts, supra note 86, at 292 (discussing survey data
from the California Health Care Foundation that indicate "approximately 8 percent of the
population" engages in protective behavior in the face of inadequate safeguards); cf Harris
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the HIT Policy Committee with making recommendations related to
"technologies that protect the privacy of health information and promote
security in a qualified health record . .. with the goal of minimizing the
reluctance of patients to seek care ... because of privacy concerns.
' %
Broadly, there are two types of privacy concerns associated with per-
sonal health information. First, most consumers have a basic desire for
some form of health information privacy independent of any particular
risks attached to violations of that privacy. Alan Westin has termed this a
"'pure privacy' position-a sense of violation or intrusion if their sensi-
tive health information is seen by an unknown third party, even if access
is only for 'research' (no insurance or employer access is involved); even
if a promise of anonymity is offered; and even if no actual harm to repu-
tation is likely to result from such research activity."' 97 Surveys
conducted at Mayo Clinic suggest that, for many consumers, "their
greatest concern about privacy actually had to do with their privacy lo-
cally . . . [A] neighbor ... may still sometime be able to see [their]
protected health information in the course of their work."'1
98
This basic desire to shield details of our health conditions from oth-
ers may be grounded in fundamental notions of liberty and autonomy.'99
As Cass Sunstein has observed, "patients, like other human beings,
should have a presumptive right to control information that they consider
private, simply as part of their liberty."2' Indeed, the Supreme Court has
identified certain rights to privacy protected under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:. In Roe v.
Interactive, Harris Poll #27: Many U.S. Adults are Satisfied with the Use of Their Personal
Health Information (Mar. 26, 2007), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-lnteractive-
PolI-Research-Health-Privacy-2007-03.pdf [hereinafter Harris Poll] (indicating that 17% of
those surveyed reported having withheld information from doctors and hospitals due to pri-
vacy concerns).
196. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 3002(b)(2)(B)(i), 123 Stat. 115,234 (2009).
197. WESTIN, supra note 20, at 15.
198. Wood, supra note 3 1, at 184.
199. See Terry & Francis, supra note II, at 698 (2007) ("The accepted rationale for
health privacy and confidentiality is autonomy.") (citing Tom L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 410 (4th ed. 1994)); see also Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1088, 1116-17 (2002) (discussing theories of pri-
vacy rooted in personal autonomy and dignity).
200. Cass Sunstein, Privacy and Medicine: A Comment, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 709, 710
(2001); see also Mike Koetting, Comments on Privacy and Medicine 30 J. LEG. STUD. 703,
703-04 (2001) ("So why the great uproar about privacy? In part, people would simply prefer
to keep their health concerns to themselves.").
201. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (stating that the right to privacy is
"founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty") (citing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)). See also Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) (stating that matters "involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
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Whalen, the Court explained that the constitutionally protected "zone of
privacy" includes "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters. 20 2 And, although the exact scope of the protection remains
ambiguous,2 O courts have held that medical information falls within this
zone: "There can be no question that an employee's medical records,
which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within
the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection. ' ' °
In addition to autonomy or liberty-based notions of privacy, one
might also advance utilitarian-or generally consequentialist-
arguments in favor of privacy protection. For example, disclosure of sen-
sitive health information can have adverse effects on patients, ranging
from embarrassment, to unemployment, or even ostracism. 2°' Further,
doctor-patient confidentiality creates incentives for patients to reveal
pertinent information about their conditions-for some patients, it is a
threshold requirement if they are to seek medical care at all. 2 6
Bracketing the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, patients are
likely to weigh tangible harms associated with invasions of privacy in a
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
202. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-99.
203. In Whalen, the Court upheld a New York law requiring doctors to provide the state a
copy of all prescriptions written for certain drugs with both illegal and legal uses. The court
observed that these disclosures are not "meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other
unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health care." Id. at 601.
It continued: "[D]isclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to
insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential part of modern
medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the
patient." Id. As the Third Circuit recently explained in Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, "the
question of the scope of the constitutional right to privacy in one's medical information is
largely unresolved." 428 F.3d 167, 178 n.10 (3rd Cir. 2005). See also Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S.
703, 717 n.24 (2000) (finding the common-law privacy "right" to be left alone "is more accu-
rately characterized as an 'interest' that States can choose to protect in certain situations")
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967)).
204. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3rd Cir. 1980). See
also Solove, supra note 199, at 1107 n.93 (collecting cases). Note, too, that state common law
generally recognizes a private cause of action sounding in torts for invasions of privacy. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 (1965).
205. See Sunstein, supra note 200, at 711; Norman M. Bradburn, Medical Privacy and
Research, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 687, 691 (2001). We do not contend that any particular privacy
protective regime falls out of a utilitarian analysis. In fact, the importance of further study of
the positive and negative effects of various regulatory regimes is one of the policy emphases of
this Article. In the interim, we suspect that many utilitarian analyses ought to be regarded as
indeterminate. We note simply that utilitarian arguments have been advanced on behalf of
health information privacy and that there are utilitarian grounds that may be considered.
206. See Sunstein, supra note 200, at 711; Terry & Francis, supra note I1, at 699. Some
who view privacy as a fundamental right, however, chide this instrumentalist approach to
privacy, fearing that it provides a slippery slope to allowing privacy concerns too easily to give
way to competing values, such as the lower healthcare costs and reduced medical errors that
HIT promises. See id.
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roughly homogenous fashion-a dollar lost is a dollar lost. On the other
hand, the degree to which patients demand privacy for its own sake is
likely to vary substantially.:' Indeed, a relatively large amount of survey
and experimental data indicates that consumers have heterogeneous pri-
208vacy preferences. For example, a Medicare recipient may be more
reluctant to share personal information than a twenty-year-old college
student who maintains a Facebook page and "tweets" regularly about her
daily life.2° On the other hand, an older person who suffers from multi-
ple ailments, sees multiple treating physicians, and on occasion requires
critical care may have very different views about trade-offs between the
medically optimal flow of health information and extremely rigorous
privacy protections than, say, a typical person in her twenties, for whom
chronic illness, co-morbidities, and complex teams of health care pro-
viders may be distant abstractions.
The second type of concern regards the tangible damage that can re-
sult when one person uses another's personal health information to
commit fraud. Medical records typically contain sensitive personally
identifying information, such as some combination of patients' names,
addresses, and social security numbers. A thief could use such informa-
tion to access victims' existing credit card, checking, savings, or other
accounts, or to create new accounts in the victims' names.2' Because
medical records also have information about health insurance, and health
207. As Daniel J. Solove observes, "Because privacy involves protecting against a plu-
rality of different harms or problems, the value of privacy is different depending upon which
particular problem or harm is being protected. Not all privacy problems are equal; some are
more harmful than others. Therefore, we cannot ascribe an abstract value to privacy. Its value
will differ substantially depending upon the kind of problem or harm we are safeguarding
against." "I've Got Nothing to Hide" and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 745, 763 (2007).
208. For example Alan Westin has found evidence that consumers can be grouped into
three categories based on their views on privacy: privacy fundamentalists; privacy pragmatists;
and privacy unconcerned. Opinion Surveys: What Consumers Have to Say About Information
Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the
Comm. on Energy cnd Commerce, 107th Cong. 18 (2001) (statement of Alan Westin, Profes-
sor Emeritus, Columbia University) available at http://archives.energycommerce.house.gov/
reparchives/107/heaings/05082001Hearing209/Westin309.htm [hereinafter Westin, Opinion
Surveys]. See also Il-Horn Hann et al., Overcoming Online Information Privacy Concerns: An
Information-Processing Theory Approach, 24 J. MGMT. INFO. Sys. 13 (2007); Sarah Spieker-
mann et al., E-privacy in 2nd Generation E-Commerce: Privacy Preferences Versus Actual
Behavior (2001), http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/-jensg/research/paper/grossklags-e-
Privacy.pdf; Bernardo A. Huberman et al., Valuating Privacy, http://infosecon.net/workshop/
pdf/7.pdf.
209. Trenkle, supra note 177, at 282 ("[Pirivacy and security ... mean different things to
different people ... The 75-year-old on Medicare has a very different idea of privacy and
security than the 18-year-old who is text messaging and doing a lot of things on the web to-
day."); see also, Pritts, supra note 86, at 307 ("People have ... a wide range of privacy
thresholds that they are comfortable with.").
210. See SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT, supra note 17, at 17.
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information, consumers also may be subject to "medical identity theft,"
which the FTC has defined as the use of "your personal information
without your knowledge or consent to obtain, or receive payment for,
medical treatment, services, or goods."
Recent data find that 8.1 million Americans (3.6% of the adult popu-
lation) reported becoming aware that they were a victim of some sort of
identity fraud in 2007.2 2 There are two basic varieties of identity fraud:
existing account and new account. Existing account fraud involves the
use of the victim's account information, such as a credit card number,
along with other personally identifying information to make unauthor-
ized charges on the victim's existing account. New account fraud is more
akin to what commonly may be thought of as identity theft: a thief uses
the victim's personal information, such as social security number, date of
birth, and address, to set up new accounts (e.g., credit cards, cell phones)
under the victim's name. Because new account fraud can be difficult to
detect and rectify, it is much more costly to consumers and businesses
than existing account fraud.2 3 New account fraud also is less common
than existing account fraud due to the larger costs involved in setting up
a false identity.2'4 For 2006, the FTC reported that 78% of all identity
theft reported involved misuse of existing accounts.2 '
In most cases, victims of identity fraud do not know how the thief
obtained their personal data.2 16 Of those who do know, however, most
211. ET.C., RESOLVING SPECIFIC IDENTITY THEFT PROBLEMS, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/
microsites/idthe ft/consumers/resolving-specific-id-the ft-problems.html#MedicalldentityTheft.
The Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection maintains an Identity Theft web page,
with information for consumers, businesses, law enforcement, and others, at http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/index.html. This definition would seem to include
medical purchases made with credit cards, which would not be related to HIT.
212. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 2008 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REPORT: CON-
SUMER VERSION 4 (Feb. 2008) [hereinafter JAVELIN 2008 REPORT]. An FTC/Synovate survey
conducted in 2006 estimated that 8.4 million Americans (or 3.7% of the adult population)
were identity theft victims. See SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT, supra note 17, at 4.
213. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION:
DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT Is LIMITED;
HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 8 (June 2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d07737.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2007 REPORT]. For example, the FTC reports that the
median value of goods and services obtained by identity thieves was $457 for existing account
fraud, compared to $1,350 for new account fraud, and that the median consumer out-of-pocket
expense was $0 and four hours for existing account fraud compared to $40 and ten hours for
new account fraud. See SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT, supra note 17, at 5.
214. See GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 213, at 22 (reporting that most thieves prefer
credit or debit card numbers because these can quickly be converted into cash as opposed to
the more labor-intensive process of setting up a new account under a false identity).
215. See SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT, supra note 17, at 4.
216. See JAVELIN 2008 REPORT, supra note 212, at 5-6 (reporting that 65% of victims
did not know how the thief gained access to their information); SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT,
supra note 17, at 30-31 (reporting that 56% of victims did not know how the thief gained
access to their information).
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(79%) report that the thief obtained the data through direct contact (e.g.,
theft or retrieval of a lost wallet, stolen mail, or from a 
transaction). 217
Seventeen percent of those surveyed reported that the thief was a friend
or family member, but only seven percent of known theft comes from
data breaches28
Medical identity theft-a type of identity fraud to which medical re-
cords may be especially susceptible-appears to be relatively rare.
According to an FTC survey, three percent of those whose personal data
was misused reported that the thief had used their medical insurance,
2 '
1
and 0.4% of all identity fraud victims reported that their personal data
was used to create a new medical insurance policy.220 The same survey
found that three percent of victims reported that their information was
used to obtain medical treatment, services, or supplies.22 ' It is not clear
how broad this category is, as it may cover purchases of things such as
cough medicine or band aids with a stolen credit card number. Addition-
ally, the extent to which these categories are overlapping (i.e., victims
report the same incidence of identity theft both as misuse of an existing
medical insurance policy (or creation of a new policy) and the purchase
of medical treatment, services, or supplies) is also unclear. Regardless,
these figures suggest that medical identity theft is an uncommon event
and that new account fraud involving medical information is even less
common: from 2001 to 2005, about 0.1% of the population suffered
medical insurance account misuse, and only 0.0148% of the adult popu-
lation had a new medical insurance account fraudulently opened with
their identity.
222
To recognize the costs imposed by various regulatory schemes is not
necessarily to impugn them-it is simply part of any regulatory cost-
benefit analysis, not its conclusion. Still, maximizing consumers' net
benefits should be a goal in the design of any regulatory regime. The
basic fact that patients have privacy interests is clear enough; so, too, are
patients' interests in effective and affordable health care. HIT systems
create value in large part because they reduce the cost of communicating
health information between different entities in the health care system-
patients, providers, labs, hospitals, and insurers. Privacy, on the other
217. JAVELIN 2008 REPORT, supra note 212, at 5.
218. Id. at 6. The Synovate data is similar. See SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT, supra note 17,
at 30.
219. SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT, supra note 17, at 17.
220. Id. at 19.
221. Id. at 21.
222. These calculations are based on the FTC/Synovate estimate of 3.7% of the adult
population being a victim of identity fraud. Thus, .03 * .037 of the adult population suffered
any form of medical identity theft and .004 * .037 of the population suffered new medical
account fraud. Id. at 4.
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hand, is at its core about limiting the flow of personal information, 2' and
laws designed to protect privacy in the realm of health care do so in large
part by raising the cost of collecting and sharing patients' health infor-
mation. Because real world data security systems and privacy provisions
are inevitably imperfect in their implementation and operation, privacy is
maximally protected when there is no PHI at all. Of course, the collec-
tion and coding of PHI could be eliminated entirely if no health care
were ever provided. That limiting case is more reductio ad absurdum
than contending policy proposal. It nonetheless highlights a certain ten-
sion between information flow and information privacy. Although other
laws also have the potential to impede HIT adoption, 224 it is no surprise
that many have identified privacy regulation as potentially presenting the
largest regulatory barrier.
It does not follow that the tradeoffs between protecting privacy and
the flow of health information inevitably are simple or linear. Regula-
tions vary in their efficiency and any given privacy provision may do
more or less to promote privacy interests at greater or lesser cost. Still,
given the likely tradeoffs, it is crucial to put the expected benefits and
harms from loss of medical privacy into perspective.
B. HIT and Privacy Risks
The key privacy concern surrounding HIT appears to turn on the fact
that HIT involves the storage of large amounts of personal health infor-
mation in data files that may be susceptible to breach;225 that is, some of
the features of electronic information-ease of aggregation, storage,
search, and transmission-that are advantageous for legitimate use of
medical information may, under certain circumstances, facilitate misuse
by reducing the cost of theft.2 26 For example, interoperable eHRs may be
subject to remote access, and large numbers of records can be stored in
223. See Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405 (1981)
(describing one notion of privacy as "concealment of information").
224. Several Workshop panelists identified state licensure requirements as a regulatory
barrier that may slow HIT implementation. See, e.g., Kolodner, supra note 34, at 267; Wood,
supra note 3 1, at 176.
225. See, e.g., Pam Dixon, Exec. Dir., World Privacy Forum, Address at Federal Trade
Commission Workshop on Innovations in Health Care Delivery 215-16 (April 24, 2008)
(transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf);
Center for Democracy & Tech., Comprehensive Privacy and Securit: Critical for
Health Information Technology I, May 2008, http:/lwww.cdt.orglhealthprivacyl
20080514HPframe.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2008) ("[HIT] initiatives pose heightened risks
to privacy."); WESTIN, supra note 20, at 15.
226. See Terry & Francis, supra note II, at 700 ("The irony is that the more inefficient a
health records system, the more it is silo-based and makes interoperability difficult, the fewer
confidentiality and security issues it will pose.").
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227
something as small as a thumb drive. - By contrast, stealing paper re-
cords requires the presence of the thief at the point of storage and either
the physical removal of the files themselves or the copying of useful in-
formation from them. As a pair of commentators assert, eMRs "are not
like paper records writ larger. The differences for patient privacy and
confidentiality and data security are matters of kind, not simply matters
of degree.,
2 '
A paramount issue when assessing HIT-related risks is the extent to
which a data breach-unauthorized acquisition of personal data-
increases a patient's risk of becoming an identity fraud victim. Data
breaches can be intentional or unintentional. For example, thieves may
target personal data, either by hacking into a network remotely or by
removing files from a building. Further, a thief may steal hardware (e.g.,
a laptop or a thumb drive) that, unbeknownst to him, contains sensitive
personal information. Accidents, such as losing a laptop, or inadvertently
posting personal information online, also can cause breaches. Data sug-
gest that most breaches are due to some sort of theft or fraud22 9 and that
criminal use of personal data is more likely when the breach is inten-
tional.23° The type of data stolen also affects expected harm: social
security numbers are almost always necessary to open a new account,
but names and addresses alone are of little utility to fraudsters."' The
most common type of personal data subject to breaches in 2008 was
names and/or addresses (35%), followed by social security numbers
227. See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Electronic Health Record Systems, 22
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 104, 121 (2008) ("With a fully interoperable [HIT], EHRs could be ac-
cessed from anywhere in the country and transmitted illicitly across the world quickly,
cheaply, and with little risk of detection."); Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Protecting
Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 335 (2007) ("Once the data is
dispersed on the Internet, it becomes available to anyone who is willing to pay for it, and it
cannot be expunged.").
228. Terry & Francis, supra note 1I, at 700.
229. For example, DataLoss DB.org reports that in 2008, 67% of data breaches were due
to parties outside the organization and another 8% were due to "malicious" inside acts. Fur-
ther, it also reports that 53% of breaches in 2008 were due either to theft of a computer or
mail, hacking, or fraud.
230. See GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 213, at 30-31; THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY
THEFT TASK FORCE, COMBATING IDENTITY THEFT: A STRATEGIC PLAN 75 n.4 (2007) avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/healthcarewrkshp/534908-OOOOI .pdf ("[Als a general
matter, the risk of identity theft is greater if the covered information was stolen by a thief who
was targeting the data (such as a computer hacker) than if information was inadvertently left
unprotected in a public location, such as in a briefcase in a hotel lobby."). See also Beales &
Muris, supra note 16, at 122 (stating that risk of misuse is higher when the breach is inten-
tional).
231. See Beales & Muris, supra note 16, at 121-22 ("Probably the most sensitive type of
widely held information is social security numbers, which are crucial for opening new ac-
counts in someone else's name" whereas "[blreaches of information with only name and
address pose virtually no consequences for consumers").
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(31%), date of birth (8%), financial information (6%), and credit card
numbers (5%).212
According to the Open Security Foundation's Data Loss Database,
there were 85 reported data breaches in the health care sector in 2009,
representing 16% of all reported data breaches.3 " These affected around
4.2 million records, which represent only 2% of total records exposed:.
Most of these breaches were intentional and were the result of thefts
(36), fraud (9), or hacking (1), although the extent to which personal in-
formation rather than hardware was the target of the theft is unclear.3
The majority of the data compromised in these breaches consisted pri-
marily of some combination of medical records, names and addresses,
and social security numbers. 36 These data suggest that breaches involv-
ing medical information are rare, but data security breach in the health
care sector may increase if eHRs become more attractive targets for
criminals as more providers migrate to HIT.
Although the actual incidence of harm from breach of medical re-
cords is unknown,237 the available data suggest that the risk is relatively
low. For example, two studies of intentional breaches report that new
identity fraud was associated with only 0.01-0.5% of records
breached.2 38 These studies, moreover, likely overstate the probability of
identity fraud conditional on a breach because, as discussed above, in-
tentional thefts of personal information are associated with higher rates
232. Open Security Foundation's Data Loss Statistics, http://datalossdb.org/statistics?
timeframe=last-year (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
233. These statistics were derived from the Open Security Foundation's Data Loss Data-
base. OPEN SECURITY FOUNDATION, CSV DATABASE (2009) http://datalossdb.org/
download (follow "Download the CVS Database (with field header)" hyperlink). See also
IDANALYTICS, NATIONAL DATA BREACH ANALYSIS 10-11 (2006) (reporting that only a small
portion ofall breaches were from medical facilities), http://www.idanalytics.comassets/
whitepaper/BreachWhitePaperFinal.pdf [hereinafter IDANALYTICS 2006]. Educational institu-
tions, businesses, and govemment all had higher numbers of breaches than the health care
sector.
234. According to the Data Loss Database, there were approximately 220 million re-
cords exposed in 2009 as a result of data breach. OPEN SECURITY FOUNDATION, supra note
233. See also SYMANTEC, GLOBAL INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT 15-16 (2008),
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white-papers/b-whitepaper-internet-security-
threat-report-xiii 04-2008.en-us.pdf; see also GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 213, at 18
(noting that health care facilities are responsible for only 2-3% of breached records and 7-
10% of all breaches).
235. OPEN SECURITY FOUNDATION, supra note 233.
236. 1.
237. See OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., DEP'T. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT FINAL REPORT 3 (2009).
238. See IDANALYTICS, DATA BREACH HARM ANALYSIS 4 (2007) (finding misuse rates
varying from 0.01% to 0.5% of files breached) ; IDANALYTICS 2006, supra note 233, at 25
[hereinafter IDANALYTICS 2007] (studying 4 breaches and finding a 0.098% misuse rate).
Spring 2010]
324 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:279
of fraud than accidental breaches.239 Further, a survey of consumers
receiving breach notification found that only two percent had suffered
any kind of identity fraud.24 0 After reviewing the available data and inter-
viewing industry sources, moreover, the GAO concluded:
"Comprehensive information on the outcomes of data breaches is not
available .... but available data and information from law enforcement
and industry association representatives indicated that most breaches
have not resulted in detected incidents of identity theft. ' 24' There does
not appear to be any reason to believe that the misuse rate for breached
medical records is higher than that of breached records generally.
24 2
Even if greater use of HIT were to increase the prevalence of
breaches and/or the average size of files involved in breaches-hence the
241exposure of more identities -increased harm would not necessarily
follow. Research suggests that there may be an inverse relationship be-
tween the size of files breached and resulting identity fraud,4  perhaps
due to resource constraints that limit fraudsters' abilities to exploit the
personal information they steal.245
This discussion has proceeded under the assumption that HIT in-
creases privacy risks, but that is not necessarily true. Although it is likely
that more information is at risk if a breach occurs in an electronic system
as compared to a paper system, there are strong reasons to believe that
electronic systems generally are more secure than paper records.2 6 For
example, encryption and strong password protection can make it harder
239. See IDANALYTICS 2007, supra note 238, at 5. See also supra text accompanying
note 230.
240. PONEMAN INST., CONSUMERS' REPORT CARD ON DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION 5
(2008). The report does not specify whether this is new or existing account fraud.
241. See GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 213, at 21.
242. See id. at 16 (reporting that a survey by the American Hospital Association of 46
hospitals found that 17 breaches from 2003 to 2007 resulted in only 6 incidences of identity
fraud, usually involving only one victim).
243. In a regulatory sense, "breach" refers to improper access to the information of a
single individual. For example, the FTC recently proposed "'breach of security' as the acqui-
sition of unsecured PHR identifiable health information of an individual in a personal health
record without the authorization of the individual," following the definition under section
13407(f)(I) of the Recovery Act. See F.T.C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 74 Fed. Reg.
17,914 (April 20, 2009) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 318) (proposed rule under Recovery
Act). Hence, when we speak informally of an incident of breach involving many files, we are
in fact referring to an incident in which there are multiple breaches.
244. See IDANALYTiCs 2007, supra note 238, at 4.
245. See id.; Beales & Muris, supra note 16, at 123.
246. See. e.g., McGraw, supra note 31, at 143 ("[Tlechnology ... can enhance privacy,
but it also magnifies the risk."); Trenkle, supra note 177, at 283 ("There is a lot of relation to
fraud and tampering that obviously can occur with e-prescribing, but e-prescribing can also
prevent a lot of that.").
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to access sensitive health information stored electronically. 47 Indeed, the
amount of sensitive personal information stolen from offline sources
dwarfs that stolen online..2 48 Further, breach detection is likely easier with
electronic systems that allow automatic "red flag" auditing processes to
detect anomalies in patient records. 4 9 Finally, as noted above, expected
losses for breach fall with the size of the breach event.
25 0
If expected privacy losses to consumers fall with HIT adoption, then
the net benefits from privacy laws that retard HIT adoption will be over-
stated. That is, if HIT reduces expected consumer losses from breach (by
reducing the probability of breach), then HIT and regulation are substi-
tute instruments to protect the privacy of patients' health records. Thus,
scaling back privacy regulations to reduce strictures on the electronic
exchange of health information may not lead to a net reduction in pri-
vacy protection. Even if enhanced privacy protection due to the adoption
of HIT does not entirely offset that lost if privacy regulations are made
more lax, it must nevertheless be counted in any cost-benefit analysis.
Although the risk (or expected harm) associated with breach appears
to be low for the population as a whole, we do not mean to deny the
harm that might be done in any particular case. First, consumers may
suffer financial account fraud; armed with a patient's social security
number, name, address, and date of birth, a fraudster could set up a new
account."' Some medical records may include bank account or credit
card information from co-payments, which could be used to hijack an
existing financial account. Second, patients could suffer harm related to
their medical insurance policies. For example, they may find themselves
bearing the expense of health care goods and services obtained without
their knowledge. 2, 2 The FTC reports that the median out-of-pocket costs
247. See OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., supra note 237,
at 4 ("[M]ost of the leading experts who participated in the Town Hall agreed that, if imple-
mented and executed properly, health IT and health information exchange could be used to
prevent, detect, and help with correction of medical identity theft in a manner that has not
been previously available."); see also Uhrig, supra note 95, at 166-67 ("E-prescribing is more
secure, in our view, than paper."); Wood, supra note 31, at 184-85 (arguing that electronic
systems are more secure than paper systems, particularly when combined with a strong audit
system).
248. JAVELIN 2008 REPORT, supra note 212, at 5; SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT, supra note
17, at 30-3 1.
249. See OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., supra note 237,
at 4.
250. See supra notes 244-245 and accompanying text.
251. See Beales & Muis, supra note 16, at 122 ("Probably the most sensitive type of
widely held information is social security numbers, which are crucial for opening new ac-
counts in someone else's name.").
252. That is, consumers may be billed for, or otherwise alleged to be responsible for,
health care goods and services obtained, without their knowledge, by and for others. See, e.g.,
PAM DIXON, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT: THE INFORMATION CRIME
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to victims of fraud on existing non-credit card accounts and new ac-
counts (not limited to medical insurance) were $0 and $40,
respectively.:' However, in some circumstances the costs can be much
higher: the 951h percentile costs of these types of fraud were $1,200 and
$5,000, respectively. '5 4 Consumers also may encounter protracted diffi-
culties when the contents of their medical records are altered in the
course of medical identity theft.2" Future benefits, coverage, eligibility,
or even treatment issues may hinge on inaccuracies in a consumer's
medical file. 256 For example, a consumer whose medical records have
been corrupted as a consequence of medical identity theft may be subject
to serious-perhaps fatal-errors in medical treatment or the exhaustion
of her insurance coverage. 27 Given the range of possible harms to which
consumers may be subject, and the potential costs of guarding against
these harms, better data about the consequences of sensitive health in-
formation theft is a crucial input to ongoing policy making.
THAT CAN KILL YOU 16 (2006), available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/wpf_
medicalidtheft2006.pdf [hereinafter DIXON 2006]. The FTC reports that the median value of
goods and survices obtained by theft associated with existing non-credit card accounts and
new accounts were $1,350 and $457, respectively. FTC, supra note 17, at 5.
253. FTC, supra note 17, at 5.
254. Id.
255. Dixon, supra note 225, at 216; see also F.T.C., supra note 211 (stating that inaccu-
rate medical records can have a serious impact on the ability to obtain proper medical care and
insurance benefits).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Skodnek, 933 F. Supp. 1108, 1121 (D. Mass. 1996) (re-
garding fines and incarceration of the defendant psychiatrist convicted of making false claims
to Medicare program, mail fraud, obstruction of justice, and witness intimidation).
There is no reason to believe that this misinformation will not lead to misfortune for
those whose names Skodnek used in fabricating the sessions. This is an information
age. While nominally confidential, these records are vulnerable to disclosure to any
number of sources. Whether it should or not, the misinformation will almost cer-
tainly have an impact on patients' lives. It may determine whether an individual will
be given a health insurance policy; it may decide whether he or she will receive
government clearance; it may affect a whole host of other situations.
Id. at 1121. See also DIXON 2006, supra note 252, at 5-9 (describing types of harms consum-
ers may suffer from medical identity theft and providing examples of certain cases); AHIMA
e-HIM Work Group on Medical Identity Theft, Mitigating Medical Identity Theft, 79 JOURNAL
OF AHIMA 63, 64 (Jul. 2008) (describing an anecdote from one case of medical identity theft
in which a victim was threatened with the loss of her children because her medical records
included a positive test for methamphetamines for a newborn baby, which was not hers).
257. See, Dixon, supra note 225, at 216; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Protect-
ing Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 335 (2007) ("Loss or
corruption of health data can also require the duplication of painful medical tests or even
cause serious and life-threatening medical errors.").
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C. Costs and Benefits of Various Privacy Regulations
Privacy regulation takes three primary forms: consent requirements,
breach notification requirements, and data security requirements. As dis-
cussed below, each type of regulation is likely to be associated with
distinct costs and benefits to patients and providers. These differences
may, in turn, have varying effects on HIT adoption. Consequently, the
optimal level of privacy regulation is likely to vary across types of pri-
vacy regulations.
1. Consent and Authorization
Federal and state consent requirements are various. Some state pri-
vacy laws require express consent or written authorization for
disclosures that are excluded from HIPAA authorization requirements,
such as those made for treatment and payment purposes."' Because
HIPAA sets a federal floor for disclosure requirements, some covered
entities may adopt policies to obtain and document consent for disclo-
sures under circumstances in which federal law would not require it." 9
Due to the nature of the communications to which they typically ap-
ply, however, consent requirements are likely to have only a modest
impact on the risk of medical identity theft or other tangible harms that
may be associated with the disclosure of sensitive health information.
Because breach is in most cases due to theft or fraud, and because breach
due to theft or fraud is most likely to lead to tangible harm, it seems
unlikely that express consent or authorization requirements-providing
patients with a veto right with respect to voluntary communication be-
tween, e.g., providers, hospitals, insurers, and pharmacies-would
appreciably reduce the frequency of identity theft. The benefits from
consent requirements, therefore, are likely to accrue primarily in the
form of "pure privacy" protection. Consent requirements, by mandating
that covered entities consult with a patient before sharing the patient's
health records (or the PHI within), provide patients a modicum of con-
trol over third-party access to their sensitive health information in the
regular course of business.
At the same time, consent requirements perhaps most clearly impact
potential HIT benefits by increasing the marginal cost of communication.
258. LINDA L. DIMITROPOULOS, PRIVACY AND SECUIRTY SOLUTIONS FOR INTEROPER-
ABLE HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE: ASSESSMENT OF VARIATION AND ANALYSIS OF
SOLUTIONS 3-1 to 3-3 (2007) "Although the Privacy Rule allows the disclosure of health in-
formation for treatment, payment, or health care operations without consent, many state laws
require such written consent to disclose health information for these purposes, using various
terms in addition to consent, such as permission, authorization, or release (here, collectively
referred to as consent." Id. at 3-2.
259. See NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-8.
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For example, HIT can reduce the cost of transmitting test results be-
tween a hospital and an outside laboratory, which can improve outcomes
and reduce costs by, for example, eliminating the need for duplicative
tests. Requiring the hospital and the laboratory independently to obtain
and document the patient's consent before transmitting results, however,
reduces one of HIT's key benefits-rapid and low-cost exchange of
health information. That adds cost to transactions likely to occur in any
event (a hospital's access to a certain test known to be important, recent,
and available), but it also adds cost to the search for, retrieval, and verifi-
cation of potentially pertinent clinical information. When information
search is costly, less of it is likely to get done. Recall, for example, the
millions of adverse events attributable to avoidable medication errors.260
Generally, these are deemed avoidable because they are predicated on
information that is in error at the point of care, not on information that is
wrong or unavailable throughout the health care system. Indeed, many
errors are avoidable precisely because they involve information trans-
mission errors.26 ' Hence, at the margin, such requirements can add to
health care costs and impede the flow of important health care informa-
tion. Although HIPAA generally exempts communications like these
from its authorization requirements, some state regulations do not. 6 2 Fur-
ther, as discussed below, when state law is unclear, providers rationally
may err on the side of caution-requiring unneeded documentation be-
fore disclosing health information to a third party or sometimes
withholding the information altogether.
If consent requirements reduce HIT benefits, providers also will be
less likely to adopt HIT in the first place. Some empirical evidence sup-
ports this hypothesis. Specifically, as discussed in Part III of this Article,
eHR adoption exhibits local networks effects; hospital adoption rates
tend to be a positive function of the number of hospitals in an area that
have adopted eHR systems. 26' These network effects, however, disappear
entirely in states that apply certain consent requirements to hospitals.'
6 4
In addition, because they tend to suppress the local network benefits as-
sociated with hospital eHR adoption, these state laws are associated with
260. See supra notes 7, 57-61, and accompanying text.
261. See Bo. ON HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 7, at 121-22.
262. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-21 A-25 (West 2009) (requiring an HMO to obtain patient
consent before releasing any information on diagnosis, treatment, or health to anyone); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. I I l § 70E (West 2010) (requiring hospitals to obtain patient consent before
releasing records); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651 subd. 16 (requiring hospitals to obtain patient
consent before releasing information).
263. See supra notes 169, 17 1-175, and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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lower-up to 25% lower-rates of HIT adoption. 26' The data also sug-
gest that hospitals adopting eMRs in states with such privacy
requirements are more likely to adopt proprietary, closed systems than
266
open or interoperable ones. In related research, Miller and Tucker ana-
lyze the effects of HIT adoption on neonatal mortality, and find that
certain HIT adoption reduces infant mortality by about one percent, with
gains twice as large for African American children as for whites. 267 Taken
together with their research on the effect of state privacy laws on HIT
adoption, it appears that various state privacy regulations that apply
above the federal floor may have costs in terms of patient outcomes.
2. Breach Notification
Breach notification rules generally require covered entities to notify
patients when unauthorized persons gain access to the patients' PHI.
These laws can reduce the expected damages from identity theft-
medical or otherwise-through three primary channels. First, when a
patient is informed of a breach of which she would otherwise be un-
aware, she can take prophylactic actions against the misuse of her• - 269
information. Second, if a breach has already resulted in identity theft,
notification may allow a victim to limit her damages by, for example,
notifying creditors or insurers and cancelling accounts. 7 ' Survey data
suggest that consumers who learn of fraudulent activity on their accounts
early are able to mitigate their financial harm.27' Finally, breach notifica-
tion requirements can create incentives for firms to take steps to prevent
breach before it occurs.272 Reputational incentives, among others, are
likely to drive precautionary measures against breach. Briefly, in various
ways, some ex ante data security measures may simply be less costly to
the covered entities themselves than ex post notification of breaches that
the measures would prevent.
265. Amalia R. Miller & Catherine Tucker, Privacy Protection and Technology Diffu-
sion: The Case of Electronic Medical Records I (NET INST. WORKING PAPER No. 07-16
(2008)), available at http://www.netinst.org/Miller-Tucker_07-16.pdf (discussing the differen-
tial effects of state law medical privacy regimes on hospitals' adoption of HIT); Miller, supra
note 21, at 23 1.
266. Miller, supra note 21, at 232.
267. Id. at 233.
268. Miller and Tucker happened to have focused on neonatal mortality, but a broader
inquiry into health effects certainly could be valuable.
269. Consumers may, e.g., request new credit or insurance cards, or sign up for account
monitoring services.
270. It may not be as easy for insurers to issue new account information as it is for
banks. See OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., DEP'T. OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT FINAL REPORT 21-22 (2009).
271. See SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT, supra note 17, at 57.
272. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 213, at 32.
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Breach notification requirements also provide consumers with in-
formation about the security of their personal information. According to
some commentators, consumers have a basic right to privacy that in-
cludes being informed when their personal information has been
compromised.273 Without settling the question of the scope of consumers'
privacy rights-grounded in their constitutional rights or otherwise-we
can at least recognize a potential interest in notification.
The efficacy of various breach notification requirements is unclear,
however. Although survey data suggest that firms recognize the reputa-
tional costs of publicized breaches,"4 available (limited) empirical
evidence does not show a relationship between state breach notification
laws and the incidence of victim-reported identity fraud from 2002-
2007.275 Further, many consumers do not appear to take action in re-
sponse to notification, perhaps due to the relatively low expected
damages from breach.276 As discussed above, only a very small amount
of personal information is subject to security breach-the available data
suggest that thieves are likely to use at most .5% of all breached records
to commit fraud.277
Although they do not impact communication costs in the same direct
manner as consent requirements, breach notification requirements also
have the potential to impede HIT adoption. First, notification is costly:
the average direct and indirect cost of breach events in 2008 was $6.7
million, or $202 per record breached overall and $282 per record
278breached in the health care sector. Because some electronic databases
contain more records than paper-based systems, the cost of notification
per event may be higher with HIT. If the potential for breach were the
same with paper-based systems and electronic ones, then entities adopt-
ing HIT would likely incur larger notification costs than those that did
not. These costs may affect providers' marginal incentives to adopt (or
273. Id. at 33.
274. See PONEMAN INST., CONSUMERS' REPORT CARD ON DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION
8 (2008) (finding that abnormal customer chum is the largest cost to data breach).
275. Sasha Romanosky et al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?
(Sept. 16, 2008) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Seventh Workshop on the Econom-
ics of Information Security, Center for Digital Strategies), available at http://ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1268926.
276. The FTC reports that 44% of people who received breach notification did nothing.
SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT, supra note 17, at 57.
277. See IDANALYTiCS 2007, supra note 238, at 2.
278. See PONEMAN INST., FOURTH ANNUAL U.S. COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY 2, 6
(2009). Direct costs are those associated with detecting breaches and notifying customers.
Indirect costs are those associated with lost business due to negative publicity from the breach.
Id. As noted above, whereas here we refer to an event as encompassing an underlying set of
facts in which one or many records may be breached, there is a regulatory sense in which an
instance of breach is counted as the breach of a single individual's record. See supra note 243.
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expand current use) of HIT, which would reduce both stand-alone and
network benefits available to patients. Further, if expected costs from
breach notification requirements are high, some PHR vendors may de-
cide against entry in the first place, which is likely to have implications
for competition and consumer choice.
Also, over-warning is possible here, as it is elsewhere in health care.
In particular, breach notification that is unrelated to actual risk of harm
could over-deter the use and adoption of HIT. There already appears to
be a baseline of wariness about the security of HIT systems, and a sharp
increase in breach notification could serve unnecessarily to exacerbate
this concern. For example, if notifications become commonplace, con-
sumers may begin to develop unfounded fears of HIT. Further, because
maliciously-used personal data are stolen primarily from offline sources
rather than online databases, substitution of paper records for electronic
records may have the unintended consequence of increasing identity
theft. As noted above, to the extent that consumers are over-warned,
they may-at some risk to their health--engage in excess privacy-
protective behavior in their interactions with health care providers. 9
Consumers may also take prophylactic steps like requesting new insur-
ance cards, placing fraud alerts on accounts, or even cancelling accounts,
which may not be justified by the risk of identity theft due to breach. In
addition, fearful of incurring the direct and reputational costs of breach
notification, entities that maintain confidential health records may adopt
security measures that increase the cost of exchanging health informa-
tion.28°
3. Data Security Requirements
As discussed in part II of this Article, in some circumstances the
FTC can bring enforcement actions against entities that fail to provide
adequate safeguards for their consumers' sensitive data. Further, HHS
has jurisdiction to enforce the Security Rule under HIPAA, which
requires covered entities to take certain steps to protect PHI stored in
electronic form . Clearly, enhanced security is likely to reduce the
incidence of breach and concomitant harms. If firms have sufficient pri-
vate incentives to keep data secure, however, these laws may lead to
over-investment in security. Indeed, some of these requirements may be
superfluous. Event studies indicate that publicly traded firms suffer sub-
stantial losses when breaches occur. Although these studies do not
279. See supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
280. See NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-21 (noting that fear of liability under
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include data from not-for-profit or privately-held entities, which charac-
terize much of the health care industry, there is no reason to suspect that
they do not suffer financial losses from breach as well. Additionally,
FTC survey data suggest that firms suffer far greater financial harms
from identity fraud than consumers, and even not-for-profit health care
providers have incentives to minimize costs. 82 Thus, providers, hospitals,
and insurers all likely have private incentives to invest in data security,
although the degree to which these incentives promote the socially desir-
able level of security measures is unclear.
To the extent that data security rules require technical protocols-
such as encryption-they affect fixed rather than marginal costs of using
HIT, and moreover, may be relatively inexpensive to implement.18' As
one FTC panelist put it, With regard to engineering HIT systems from
the ground up, a single privacy regime-even a stringent one-would be
relatively unproblematic: "What gets expensive is ... 50 different states
change the standards as well as 14 countries and the next thing you
know, it takes millions and millions of dollars worth of IT resources to
rebuild these systems." 284 In some instances, however, security require-
ments can affect marginal costs of communicating health information.
For example, covered entities may be reluctant to engage in electronic
exchanges of health information if they are uncertain that others on the
network have security measures that will meet the applicable legal
standard.85
4. Legal Uncertainty
With all three types of regulation discussed above, uncertainty about
prevailing legal standards also may increase the cost of health information
exchange. For example, despite the range of unauthorized disclosures
permitted under the Privacy Rule,
282. For example, the median value of goods and services for all categories of identity
theft was $500 compared to zero for consumers. Further, the median value for new account
fraud was $1,350 for firms compared to $40 for consumers. See SYNOVATE 2006 REPORT,
supra note 17, at 6.
283. See, e.g., HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a) (2010).
284. Dente, supra note 50, at 280; see also Berg, supra note 31, at 253-54 (comparing
the relative ease of meeting strict state standards for Marshfield Clinic, which operates wholly
within Wisconsin, with that of, e.g., GE or Epic or Cerner, who are "developing for 50 states
and territories in foreign countries"). We address the issue of state law variation in Part VI.
285. See NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-25 ("Sharing personal health informa-
tion among institutions requires a significant degree of trust in the technology, and in the other
organizations' ability to implement it. State teams found that providers were worried that enti-
ties receiving their data might not have robust security measures (as robust as the providers'
measures), and that this difference might expose them to liability in case of a security
breach.").
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[M]any providers and other covered entities require patient
permission to disclose personal health information for treatment,
payment, and health care operations to satisfy professional
ethical requirements or for risk management .... [M]ost stake-
holder organizations ... required patient permission for
treatment purposes, even if federal or state laws did not require
such permission .. . Although variation in the requirement for
and content of patient permission to disclose is due largely to
state law and organizational practices, "HIPAA" is often cited as
the basis for requiring patients' permission for treatment."'
When relevant state and federal privacy regulations are not clear,
parties may over-comply to avoid liability."" For example, ambiguous
state law provisions regarding the circumstances that trigger breach noti-
fication requirements can lead to over-notification. '8 Further, unclear
consent (or documentation of consent) requirements have led to substan-S 289
tial variation in the form and content of authorization across providers.
That variation, in turn, has made some providers unwilling to accept
consent obtained by others.2' ° Vagueness in "minimum necessary" dis-
closure requirements under the Privacy Rule also seems to have had a
chilling effect on electronic information exchange. T9 For example, be-
cause it often is technically impossible to segregate data fields in eHRs,
many hospitals allow third-party payers to have access only to paper
records.292
Note that Miller finds a one-time increase in HIT adoption associ-
ated with HHS' adoption of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.29' That is
286. NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-11. See also Dimitropoulos & Rizk, supra
note 14, at 429 (discussing how broad variation exists in the "need for.., and the actual proc-
ess of obtaining appropriate patient consent" in the context of identifying gaps and conflicts
among state laws).
287. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 224-29
(2004). Of course, the countervailing consideration for breach notification is that breach noti-
fication appears to lead to a lot of customer churn. The size of this consideration may militate
toward erring on the side of not sending notification.
288. See GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 213, at 35.
289. See NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-3 (explaining that laws that are "silent
with respect to certain aspects health information exchange" can lead to varied customs,
which can hinder HIT).
290. Id. at 6-8 ("The lack of a standard permission form, even within a state, results in
different health care entities' developing their own permission form requirements and refusing
to honor permissions obtained by other entities, thereby interfering with the legitimate flow of
information.").
291. The Privacy Rule requires that "a covered entity must make reasonable efforts to
limit protected health information to the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended pur-
pose of the use, disclosure, or request." 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1) (2010).
292. NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-16.
293. Miller, supra note 21, at 252.
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interesting but not paradoxical. Certainly, the promulgation of the federal
Privacy Rule did not reduce the regulatory obligations of health care
providers. At the same time, for some providers, it may have lowered the
perceived cost of HIT adoption precisely because it decreased providers'
legal uncertainty and exposure to liability.
294
III. STRIKING THE BALANCE
Although consumers demand privacy, it is not free. Privacy require-
ments can have positive effects on HIT adoption by helping to assuage
consumers' concerns that their sensitive health information is secure, but
beyond some threshold, it is important for policy makers to recognize
that tradeoffs between privacy protection and HIT development, adop-
tion, and use are likely inevitable. As one commenter has put it, the
debate over privacy in health care should focus on "how much [privacy]
we want to afford, which in turn is linked to thinking more carefully
about losses from its breach."2'9 Certain forms of privacy regulation ap-
pear to impose relatively large costs on eMR use while conferring
relatively little in the way of tangible countervailing benefits. Of course,
some may object to such balancing.296 For example, Solove suggests that
individual rights typically give way when pitted against the "common
good."297 That may be a legitimate matter of more general concern, but it
does not answer critical policy and legal questions, such as the level of
resources that ought to be devoted to safeguarding particular rights, or
the manner in which provisions protecting countervailing interests or
rights ought to be balanced.
One might take the position that fundamental rights-or their exer-
cise or protection-are never in tension, but as we have discussed, that is
entirely dubious in the instant case as it is more generally. Although ex-
ploration of such matters from a policy, legal, or ethical point of view
would take us well beyond the scope of this Article, we should note that,
as a general matter, our Constitutional framework balances fundamental
294. Id. (noting that some have theorized that this was because "HIPAA promoted some
adoption of EMR by making HIPAA compliance easier to demonstrate with an electronic
record than with a paper record").
295. Mike Koetting, Comments on Privacy and Medicine, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 703, 707
(2001).
296. See Terry & Francis, supra note 1I, at 699 ("This instrumental approach becomes
dangerous when applied to institutional or industrial models of care. In such models, the no-
tion too easily falls prey to arguments that see the generation, dispersal, and processing of
longitudinal patient health information primarily as a necessity to reduce overall healthcare
costs and to minimize medical error.").
297. Solove, supra note 207, at 761 ("Society will generally win when its interest are
balanced against those of the individual.").
A lime to Keep Silent and a Time to Speak
rights, interests, privileges, and powers in no small part because it must.
Even core civil liberties are not regarded as absolute. For example, under
the First Amendment, content-based regulation of speech is presump-
tively invalid, but certain categories of speech--e.g., obscenity29-are
subject to no protection and others-e.g., commercial speech 2 ---may be
subject to substantial protection, but less than that afforded political, sci-
entific, literary, or artistic speech. Generally, content-neutral regulation
of speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny and certain species of re-
strictions generally are permissible. As the Court has said, "[o]ur cases
make clear ... that even in a public forum the government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech
.... ,00 More generally, "[tlhe First and Fourteenth Amendments have
never been treated as absolutes."'0'
Speech rights and privacy rights have been variously connected.
"The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication
.... is an aspect of the broader 'right to be let alone' that one of our wis-
est Justices characterized as 'the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued .... ,,30' But that right, too, is subject to variable pro-
tection, afforded special protection "in the privacy of the home, 3°' but
lesser protection elsewhere. Similarly, the Supreme Court has on sev-
eral occasions grappled with the tension between First Amendment
guarantees to the press to publicize facts and the rights of citizens to
keep certain facts private.35 These cases have called on the Court to rule
on "a conflict between interests of the highest order-on the one hand,
the interest in the full and free dissemination of information concerning
298. "This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is
unprotected by the First Amendment." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (citations
omitted).
299. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-68 (2002) (re-affirming
the Central Hudson test as a framework for evaluating govemment restrictions on commercial
speech) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980)).
300. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Such regulation of pro-
tected speech "must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral
interests but ... it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so." Id. at
798.
301. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
302. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
303. Id. at 717.
304. "This common-law 'right' is more accurately characterized as an 'interest' that
States can choose to protect in certain situations." Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350-51 (1967)).
305. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); The Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524
(1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy
and, more specifically, in fostering free speech."3°0
Of course, in a utilitarian calculus, to the extent that most individuals
highly value a given "right" or interest, their collective valuation may
trump other interests. 7 Hence, citizens may willingly agree ex ante to
limit the circumstance under which the common good may trump an in-
dividual right. That is one route to constitutionalism (and in some sense
to the rule of law), and it is not unrelated to the distinction between act-
based and rule-based approaches to utilitarianism. But generally, the
question whether to balance competing interests does not depend on a
commitment to utilitarianism or any other form of consequentialism. It
also does not require the repudiation of a rights-based approach to pri-
vacy or anything else. 08
Returning to our concrete policy concern, when designing laws to
protect consumers' sensitive health information, there are two paramount
questions. To what extent do those privacy laws reduce consumer harm?
And, what benefits from HIT do those privacy protections impede?
In answering the first question, it is important to note as a threshold
matter that the baseline level of harm from PHI breach appears small.
Further, the nexus between some privacy laws applied to HIT and harms
from loss of privacy is tenuous. For example, it is unclear how state pri-
vacy laws that have stringent consent requirements reduce the risk of
identity fraud; there is probably little connection between consent and
avoidance of identity fraud within a treatment episode. Additionally,
breach notification laws do not appear to reduce the incidence of identity
fraud, and although the relationship between breach and risk of identity
fraud may be direct, the available data suggest that it is very slight. In-
deed, the broader class of breach notification requirements does not
appear to pass a cost-benefit test. The average direct cost to responding
to a breach (which almost surely is passed on to consumers) is $50,3o9 but
the upper bound on the median expected cost from new account fraud
(the most expensive type) in the event of a breach is $1.13."0 Indeed,
306. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
307. See Solove, supra note 297, at 761.
308. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 176
(1955) ("[A]lthough ... all men are equally entitled to be free in the sense explained, no man
has an absolute or unconditional right to do or not to do any particular thing or to be treated in
any particular way; coercion or restraint of action may be justified in special conditions con-
sistently with the general principle."); cf Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights?, 31
PHIL. Q. 1 (1981) (distinguishing "absolute rights" from those that may be "overridden:' or
justifiably infringed).
309. See PONEMON INST., FOURTH ANNUAL US COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY 3
(2009).
310. This figure is calculated as follows: The Synovate 2006 study reports a median loss
for new accounts and other frauds of $40 and 10 hours. Using the average hourly wage rate
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even for victims in the 90 h percentile of harm, the expected financial loss
is only $24. Thus, extant breach notification requirements generally do
not appear to be a good deal for consumers.
None of the preceding discussion should suggest that consumers de-
rive no benefit from privacy regulations or that concerns about the
privacy of health information are unfounded or unimportant. As dis-
cussed already, many patients clearly place an intrinsic value on privacy;
hence, regulations may provide benefits beyond those easily measured.
Moreover, society may wish to subsidize the diminution of certain ex-
treme harms." ' On the other hand, data available from behavioral
experiments suggest that consumers are willing to supply private infor-
mation for relatively small amounts of money or enhanced convenience
shopping online.' 2 Further, several studies have found a mismatch be-
tween ex ante consumer responses to general questions regarding their
desire for privacy protection and the actual tradeoffs they are willing to
make when faced with immediate choices."' Although these studies were
experimental in nature and generally involved personal information that
may be seen as less sensitive than PHI, they again suggest that patients
may be more willing to forego certain privacy protections in return for
better and/or cheaper health care than survey data suggest, especially if
the sacrificed protections are of limited efficacy in preventing tangible
harms. And at least for some patients, at least some of the time, an inter-
est in optimizing information flow may be critical.
With respect to the second question-the costs of privacy require-
ments-empirical evidence suggests that HIT adoption rates are lower in
states with stringent consent requirements. Adoption rates in these states
are lower because the regulations suppress network effects associated
with HIT adoption.' 4 Further, states with lower levels of HIT adoption
appear to have higher infant mortality rates, even after controlling for
possibly confounding variables.' 5 To the extent that the IOM is right
from April 2009 of $18.50, this results in median costs from the most expensive type of iden-
tity fraud of $225. Data from IDAnalytics puts a range of the probability of a breached file
being used in an incidence of identity fraud between 0.0001 and 0.005.
311. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 383-84 (6th ed. 2003)
(arguing for direct regulation where injury may be very large or--on related but distinct
grounds-where injuries are fatal).
312. See sources cited supra note 208.
313. Id.
314. See Miller & Tucker, supra note 12.
315. See Amalia R. Miller & Catherine Tucker, Can Healthcare IT Save Babies? (SSRN
Working Paper Series, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.consol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=l 080262#PaperDownload (describing effects of state law privacy regimes on infant mortal-
ity). Specifically, their research suggests that certain HIT adoption reduces infant mortality by
about one percent, with gains that "are twice as large for reducing African American deaths
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about the potential for ameliorating serious adverse events due to medi-
cation errors by adopting appropriate HIT, we must note again that
millions of such adverse events are on the table.' 6 Thus, by impeding the
flow of health information between providers, stringent consent re-
quirements may impose real human costs beyond their financial costs.
Consent requirements also impose direct transaction costs on consumers
and providers. Breach notification requirements impose expenses on
firms that can impede adoption of HIT by health care entities, and may
hinder entry by potential PHR providers. In this manner, these laws can
lead to higher prices and reduced consumer choice.
Although consent and breach notification requirements appear likely
to retard HIT adoption, the benefits they provide appear primarily to be
non-tangible; both types of requirements allow consumers to exercise
some dominion over their health information by providing them a veto
over who sees it in the ordinary course of business and notifying them
when unauthorized access occurs. That suggests that policy makers need
to develop a clearer understanding of consumers' underlying preferences
for privacy and how these preferences vary throughout the population-
and perhaps across treatment contexts-before undertaking costly regu-
lations that appear to provide very modest tangible benefits."' Further,
theoretical commitments about the foundations of privacy rights, or the
nature of privacy interests, cross-cut questions about the ideal scope of
privacy protections, the resources that ought to be devoted to privacy
protections, or how best to tailor privacy protections to minimize harm to
other important interests. Autonomy-based privacy rights principles may
suggest a property rights regime under which medical information be-
longs to patients, with providers enjoined from sharing PHI with third
parties without consent, but we should be wary of conclusory sugges-
tions that the precise metes and bounds of such rights would be obvious.
We suggest that until there is better information on the distribution of
privacy preferences, policy makers should exercise special caution when
considering new or extant consent and breach notification requirements.
In light of the current state of knowledge of patients' privacy prefer-
ences, we offer regulatory reform proposals for consent, breach
notification, and data security requirements. We make these suggestions
mindful that the federal government is not the only player in this policy
... (as they are] for white deaths." Miller, supra note 21, at 233. It was predicted that eMR
adoption, in that context, would cost roughly $450,000 per infant life saved. Id. at 234.
316. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
317. See Koetting, supra note 295, at 707 ("[Wie appear on the verge of incurring large
expenses from limited health care funds and/or inhibiting appropriate access to medical in-
formation for solutions that have a low likelihood of solving the problems that are at the heart
of people's concerns.").
A Time to Keep Silent and a Time to Speak
space. Indeed, the variation in state privacy regulations gives rise to the
result that overly-stringent or inconsistent privacy laws can impede HIT
adoption. Thus any approach inevitably has to grapple with the issue of
federalism, which we leave for Part VI.
One possible path forward for consent requirements would be to re-
tain the Privacy Rule's carveout for treatment purposes, but also allow
patients to opt out of HIT systems on a provider-by-provider basis. Af-
ter a provider has joined an interoperable HIT network, it would give its
patients the option to have their records sequestered from the shared sys-
tem (both retroactively and prospectively). This approach to consent has
at least three advantages. First, the Privacy Rule's treatment exception
appears to be a good candidate for a majoritarian rule because it is
unlikely that many consumers would object to providers sharing their
medical information to enable treatment. 318 Survey evidence suggests that
most patients are comfortable with the current treatment of medical re-
cords by their health care providers, 3'9 and although they have concerns
about the privacy implications of HIT, they believe that the benefits from
HIT outweigh the privacy risks.320 More generally, since the early 1990s,
a majority of consumers have described themselves as either "privacy
unconcerned" or "privacy pragmatists," who are willing to permit the use
of their personal information in return for a benefit and sufficient safe-
3'2Iguards. Only around a quarter of the population can be described as
"privacy fundamentalist," who feel that their privacy rights are not being
handled correctly, desire only an opt-in rule, and are unwilling to trade
318. See Terry & Francis, supra note II, at 703 (arguing that consentless information
flows be limited to providers within a patient's "circle of care,' which includes "practitioners
that are immediately and directly involved in the care of the patient-and on an as-needed
basis with another member of a patient's medical team"); Sunstein, supra note 200, at 712
(arguing that the presumption in favor of patient control over private information should be
rebutted when disclosure is to other doctors on a patient's "medical team" because "if this is
necessary for good treatment, the patient has no reasonable basis for complaint").
319. See Harris Poll, supra note 195 (showing 70% of patients surveyed agree that they
are satisfied with the way that doctors and hospitals treat their personal health information,
and 63% agree that the increased use of computers to record and share patient medical records
can be accomplished without jeopardizing proper patient privacy rights).
320. See Beckey Bright, Benefits of Electronic Health Records Seen as Outweighing
Privacy Risks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB I119565244262500549.html (reporting results from a Wall Street Journal Online/Harris poll
that finds although 51% (down from 61% in 2006) of those surveyed believe that the use of
electronic medical records makes it more difficult to ensure patient privacy, 60% (and 72% of
those that currently use electronic medical records) agree that the benefits of electronic medi-
cal records outweigh the privacy risks).
321. See Beales & Muris, supra note 16, at 118 (noting that the majority of consumers
are privacy pragmatists who are "willing to provide information in exchange for benefits");
Westin, Opinion Surveys, supra note 208 (noting that since the early 1990s consumers have
split into three groups: Privacy Fundamentalists (25%); Privacy Pragmatists (63%), and
Privacy Unconcerned (12%)).
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privacy protections for benefits 22 These data suggest that most patients
are satisfied with the status quo and are willing to allow providers to
share their health information in return for benefits.
Second, maintenance of the Privacy Rule would allow high and low-
demanders for privacy to self-select into different regulatory regimes
rather than force patients to pool into a regime that provides either inef-
ficiently high or low levels of privacy. Because those who opt out would
internalize the costs of their decisions, in terms of lost HIT benefits, they
would do so only if they value their privacy more highly than those
benefits.1 23 The remainder of the population, who are willing to accept
the Privacy Rule's requirements, will also enjoy the full benefits of HIT,
whatever they prove to be. Although the choice of default position is
irrelevant in a world without transaction costs, 2' in the real world an
opt-in default is likely to be more efficient than an opt-out default. As
noted above, it is likely that the majority of patients would choose to
participate in HIT networks under the status quo. An opt-in default
would economize on aggregate transaction costs by requiring fewer peo-
ple to make a decision. Further, it may be costly to make an opt-in/opt-
out decision and the opt-in default is likely to cause less harm.326
Third, by eliminating consent for individual information requests for
treatment purposes, this approach would not affect the marginal cost of
the flow of information.327 It is important to note, however, that this result
is only obtained if opt-out occurs at the provider level. If the general
regime were to allow privacy-sensitive patients to require their providers
to obtain and document consent for each discrete instance of information
322. See id.; Harris Poll, supra note 195, at I ("[A]bout 25 percent of the public consis-
tently feels that their legitimate privacy rights are not being handled properly by business,
employer, or government organizations.").
323. Indeed, the opt-out choice would not necessarily be so stark, as it would provide
high-demanders for privacy two sorts of choices: they could opt out of HIT systems generally,
internalizing the costs implicit in opt-out decisions, but they could also choose ad hoc use of
HIT systems in particular contexts in which private assurances or protections more closely
matched their preferences (for example, in a particular practice setting, or with a utility, where
special protections substantially exceeded those given publicly).
324. For example, these opt-out patients would not enjoy monetary and non-monetary
benefits from enhanced communication among health care providers to coordinate care. See
Terry & Francis, supra note II, at 701-02. They would, of course, enjoy some, as public
health or various benefits accruing to the public fisc would be at least partly available to the
larger population, although we should acknowledge that, at the margin, these may be dimin-
ished according to the number of opt-outs.
325. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 15 (1960).
326. See Beales & Muris, supra note 16, at 114-18 (discussing how, in the context of
consumer financial information, the informational costs of exercising choice regarding
whether to opt-in to or opt-out of an information-sharing regime can swamp expected benefits,
such that the default position often becomes the status quo).
327. See Terry & Francis, supra note II, at 703.
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sharing (even for legitimate treatment or reimbursement purposes) or to
demand other ad hoc mandates-say, to select certain records or parts of
records from providers to be excluded from the HIT network-that
would foist costs on those remaining in the system by suppressing net-
work externalities, and thus HIT adoption rates.12' Further, it would
reduce providers' willingness to rely on electronic records for treatment
decisions to the extent that they have concerns about accuracy, which
would also raise costs and reduce HIT adoption rates .129 Finally, allowing
patients to opt-out of the system on a record-by-record (or information
within a record) basis would impose additional recordkeeping costs on
providers, which likely could not be charged only to those who request
the segregation of their information but, instead, would be built into eve-
ryone's charges.
With respect to breach notification, triggers based on the relative risk
of harm to consumers, rather than on mere incidence of access also ap-
pear to strike a desirable balance. For example, the FTC's proposed
breach notification rule for PHRs moves in this direction by requiring
notification only when the breach involves unencrypted data and allow-
ing PHR vendors to rebut the presumption that breached data has been
acquired. 30 This proposal, for example, would relieve a PHR vendor
from the burden of notification when a staff member inadvertently ac-
cesses a database.
Substitution away from consent and breach notification requirements
into data security requirements may be more efficient. Because the former
species of regulation implicate marginal costs of data transmission, they
risk deterring beneficial sharing of health information. On the other hand,
data security requirements implicate primarily (if not exclusively) fixed
costs. Thus, these requirements may be more efficient than other forms of
regulation to assure patient privacy from an error-costs perspective.
Finally, although the preceding discussion has focused entirely on
optimal types of regulation, it is worth exploring the extent to which
government intervention is needed at all. The Constitution clearly pro-
tects citizens from unwarranted government collection and
government-mandated disclosures of private information,"' and is likely
to prohibit the state from setting a ceiling on the privacy protections that
328. See id. at 702-03.
329. This is a concern that has been raised about some approaches to PHRs, or
PHR/eHR interfaces. See Dimitropoulos and Rizk, supra note 14, at 430; Koppel, supra note
56.
330. Health Breach Notification Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 17,914, 17,915-16 (Apr. 20, 2009)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 318).
331. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 570 (3rd Cir. 1980).
Spring 2010]
342 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:279
private parties may provide, for example, by mandating disclosures
without consent. 32 There is, however, no Constitutional mandate for the
government to set a privacy floor for private entities:" Private entities
face competition in the marketplace. To the extent that health care pro-
viders and HIT vendors compete over privacy protections, the need for
regulation may be diminished. In other areas of the economy, there is
evidence that firms are aware that consumers value privacy and that
firms compete on this dimension.3  If evidence of direct competition on
this dimension of services is slight in the health care arena, it is nonethe-
less important to note that, for example, private PHR providers have
expended resources on better understanding consumer knowledge and
preferences. Microsoft, Google, Kaiser, and others prominently display
their privacy policies on their PHR web sites:" The primary online
PHRs are free and consequently generate revenue by attracting traffic for
advertisers. In such double-sided markets, when something (e.g., over-
the-air television, information or entertainment on a Web site) is given
away to consumers, competition necessarily occurs in non-price dimen-
sions to attract "eyes" or views. These corporate displays are one
example.
In many instances, regulation or liability is premised on informa-
tional asymmetries. It may be reasonable to assume that consumers are
poorly positioned to appreciate all the risks associated with certain prod-
ucts, such that the market alone may fail to produce efficient precautions
or levels of safety. 6 By contrast, in the face of information problems
that cause them to overestimate their risks, consumers may demand "too
much" privacy. For example, a large percentage of consumers say that
332. See Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 180 (3rd Cir. 2005).
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., Peter Swire, Antitrust, Privacy, and Other Non-Price Competition, ICOMP
Conference on Privacy Competition in the Online Market Place (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.i-
comp.org/calendar/downloadFile/97 (describing how Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and Ask
compete over privacy features for search engines and how Facebook and MySpace compete
over privacy for social networks); PAUL H. RuBIN & THOMAS M. LENARD, PRIVACY AND THE
COMMERCIAL USE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 40-42 (2002) (cataloging examples of the
market disciplining firms for violating consumers' preferences for privacy).
335. In addition to a link to its "full Privacy Statement" prominently displayed on the
opening page of Microsoft Health Vault's site for personal use, is the following: "Our Health-
Vault Privacy Principles: • You control the Microsoft HealthVault record you create. ° You
decide what goes into your HealthVault record. • You decide who can see, use and share your
information. • Microsoft won't use your information in HealthVault to personalize ads or ser-
vices without explicit permission'" Microsoft HealthVault, http://www.healthvault.com
Personal/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2010); Google Health, Take Charge of Your Health
Information, https://health.google.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2010); Kaiser Permanente,
Privacy Practices for Our Web Site, https://members.kaiserpermanente.org/kpweb/
entryPage.do?cfe=072 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
336. See SHAVELL, supra note 287, at 214-15.
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they mistrust HIT, but an even larger percentage reports that they are
relatively ignorant about HIT.337 Similarly there appears to be a mismatch
between consumer fears of loss from identity fraud after a breach and
actual levels of harm. 8 These data indicate that consumers probably
overestimate actual risk of harm associated with HIT and are unaware
that HIT may tend to make records safer rather than more vulnerable.
Further, it is dubious that patients are generally aware that stringent con-
sent and breach notification requirements are likely to have a negative
impact on HIT adoption and use. Thus, there are good reasons to be con-
cerned that the market may produce "too much" privacy, and that the
current level of demand for regulation to protect the privacy of electronic
health information is greater than it would be in a world of perfect in-
formation. Politicians-who may be susceptible to some of the same
information costs-may thus be biased toward over-regulation; some
more knowingly may be tempted to take advantage of consumers' (and
voters) relative lack of knowledge to push through self-aggrandizing, but
harmful privacy regulations. As Professor Sunstein notes, in the face of
"isolated but highly publicized cases, . . . [plolicy entrepreneurs, includ-
ing candidates interested in reelection and good publicity, might well
seek increasingly severe controls., 339 These informational issues again
admonish policy makers to be cautious when developing privacy regimes
to govern HIT. At the very least, policy defaults ought to be set to favor
clarity over opacity, and to avoid disutility based on needless cues to in-
formation problems or counter-productive decision making biases.)40
IV. PREEMPTION VERSUS FEDERALISM IN PRIVACY REGIMES
Leaving aside the stringency of any particular state regulatory re-
gime, there are also costs associated with the patchwork of regimes.
Although allowing states to experiment with different approaches to pri-
vacy is likely to have benefits, it also comes at a cost. Inconsistent state
337. See NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-39 (showing that although nearly half
of consumers surveyed were apprehensive about using electronic health records, 57% reported
not having "read, seen, or heard" anything about electronic health records prior to the survey,
which suggests "a fundamental information gap about electronic health information exchange
within the general consumer population").
338. See PONEMAN INST., CONSUMERS' REPORT CARD ON DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION
5 (2008) (reporting that while 32% of those surveyed believed that following a data breach
their likelihood of becoming an identity fraud victim was greater than 40%, the actual inci-
dence of fraud was 2%, which suggests "consumers' fears about the possibility of becoming
an identity theft victim do not reflect the actual rate of experience").
339. Sunstein, supra note 200, at 713.
340. See generally, RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Yale Univ. Press 2008).
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privacy laws can impede cross-border communication of health informa-
tion and can increase the cost of designing and implementing HIT
systems.
There appears to be broad recognition-even in the states them-
selves-that much is at stake in furthering interoperable HIT and that the
current mix of state laws may be a serious barrier to doing so. For exam-
ple, 42 states are now working in various consortia-under the auspices
of the Health Information Security and Privacy Collaboration
(HISPC) '-at diverse tasks aimed at furthering the flow of electronic
health information, including efforts at harmonizing state health privacy
and data security law. 2 Participants in these efforts have observed not
only that "[m]any states have a series of antiquated, fragmented, and
non-standardized laws that may unintentionally create a barrier to the
appropriate exchange of electronic health information," but that "com-




A national study prepared for HHS observes that,
Relevant laws and regulations developed and evolved largely in
response to the paper-based health information exchange. Legal
restrictions addressing health information exchange were often
dispersed across many different statutes and regulations and are
sometimes inconsistent with one another. Several states reported
that antiquated laws written for paper-only environments cre-
ated significant barriers to electronic health information
exchange. Other states noted that laws were silent with respect
to certain aspects of health information exchange, leading to var-
ied business practices and customs."
341. HISPC was established through a contract with HHS to address the privacy and
security challenges presented by electronic health information exchange through multistate
collaboration ... Each HISPC participant had the support of its state or territorial governor
and maintained a steering committee and contact with a range of local stakeholders to ensure
that developed solutions accurately reflect local preferences. RTI INT'L HEALTH INFO.
SECURITY & PRIVACY COLLABORATION (HISPC), http://www.rti.org/brochures/Health-info-
Security.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
342. See generally Health Info. Security & Privacy Collaboration (HISPC) Nat'l Confer-
ence, Bethesda, MD (Mar. 4-6, 2009) (conference agenda and other materials are available at
http://www.rti.org/events.cfm?bgnyear=2009 (follow the "Health Information Security and
Privacy Collaboration (HISPC) National Conference" hyperlink)). It should be noted that such
consortia organized under HISPC tend to be smaller than national in scope. For example, at
the March 2009 conference there was a report on harmonization efforts undertaken by an I I-
state consortium chaired by Indiana. Id.
343. Julie Roth, Christina Stephan & Patricia Gray, Harmonizing State Privacy Laws for
HIE, Health Info. Security & Privacy Collaboration (HISPC) Nat'l Conference (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://www.rti.org/files/hisp/Harmonizing-State-Privacy-Law.pdf. See supra note 342.
344. NATIONWIDE SUMM., supra note 13, at 6-3.
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For all of that, relatively little attention has been paid to the possi-
bility of preempting state law requirements in this area. To be sure, a
few commentators have recommended the express preemption of state
health information privacy laws, generally because they see the re-
quirements-and the task of compliance with them-as exceedingly
complex or otherwise burdensome for health care providers or other
business entities. 5 But more general considerations of the costs im-
posed within and across bodies of state law have been few, and many
broad-ranging HIT policy discussions are silent regarding the possibil-
ity of preemption. For example, the HHS report mentioned in the
preceding paragraph considers various state law issues and means of
addressing them, and does not mention the possibility of broader pre-
emption of state law.' At the 2008 FTC Workshop, three panels of
participants addressed HIT-related issues, each incorporating privacy
issues into its discussion, but no participants discussed the policy op-
tion of preemption, not even for the purpose of rejecting it 47 The
Recovery Act generally retains the very limited sort of preemption con-
templated under HIPAA, 48 under which the states may not waive the
minimum requirements of HIPAA and the federal Privacy Rule, even as
they are free to regulate unchecked "above" those minimum require-
ments.
There may, of course, be reasons to advocate for state health privacy
regulation, whether favoring particular requirements or the maintenance
of state prerogatives. First, as consumers may be harmed by violations of
their health information privacy, and as they may be poorly situated to
345. That is not to suggest that it has never been mentioned. See Testimony on the Pro-
posed Rule on Confidentiality of Patient Records: Hearing on Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions 106th
Cong. (2000) (testimony of Joanna C. Horobin, Executive Vice President For Commercial
Development, EntreMed Inc.) (suggesting the patchwork of state regulations is unworkable,
and calling for new federal legislation that generally preempts state medical privacy law);
Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as Personal
Information Protectors, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 55, 105-06 (2007) (advocating new federal law that
"must contain an express preemption clause stating that the legislation is intended to serve as a
ceiling as well as a floor"); cf Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealth Diptych: The Impact of Privacy
Regulation on Medical Error and Malpractice Litigation, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 368
(2001) ("[T]he unsatisfactory 'more stringent' partial preemption provision [in current force]
is likely to befuddle and annoy healthcare institutions with interstate businesses for years into
the future. There may be even worse to come as state legislators are prodded by dissatisfied
privacy advocates to pass statutes that fill perceived gaps in the PIHI regulations, thereby
increasing the number of non-preempted protections.").
346. See NATIONWIDE SUMm., supra note 13. The term "preemption" does appear in the
report, albeit in a different context.
347. See Address at FrC Workshop on Innovations in Health Care Delivery (Apr. 24, 2008)
(transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bclhealthcare/hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf).
348. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), § 13421(a), 123
Stat. 115, 229 (2009).
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provide (or contract) for protection against such harms, one may be con-
cerned about the general question of the adequacy of the larger set of
federal and state privacy regulations. At the FTC Workshop, panelists
were generally in agreement that privacy concerns were important to
HIT policy, and although some panelists were especially concerned
about the costs of excessive regulation, others described the then-current
mix of federal and state regulation as insufficiently protective of con-
sumers' interests .
It also could be argued that the states may offer an important "labo-
ratory" for testing various regulatory responses to the problems
presented by emerging or rapidly changing technologies. For example,
Bruce Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein have argued that state consumer
privacy law is generally superior to federal law in the realm of digital
information precisely because of the dynamic nature of the underlying
technologies and consumers' interaction with them."0 Where consumers'
expectations of privacy remain unclear, there may not be a set of com-
mon, baseline costs and benefits associated with certain industry
practices that is adequate to justify uniform federal law. State law, on the
other hand, "emerges from 51 laboratories and therefore presents a more
decentralized model that fits the evolving nature of the Internet ....
[and] competition among state laws can mute the inefficient tendencies
of interest group legislation. 35' In addition, "[t]he U.S. government's
regulation of privacy rights could determine important aspects of the
Internet's structure and reduce the flexibility and openness that has made
the Internet a major economic force."3 '
The argument is far from decisive in the present case. First, we
should note that Kobayashi and Ribstein expressly decline to extend
their argument about the potential superiority of state law to the area of
medical privacy. They distinguish "information that consumers clearly
349. Compare Pritts, supra note 86, at 287 ("People] will not adopt it [HIT] if there is
not adequate trust that their information will be kept confidential."), with Miller, supra note
2 1, at 231, 233 (regarding costs of state law privacy protections-impact on HIT adoption and
relationship between HIT adoption and neonatal mortality, respectively); Dente, supra note
50, at 274 (discussing the need to think about health needs and the importance of information
"when we balance the need for connectivity, interoperability, information, with the rights of all
of us to have ... patient privacy"). Cf Trenkle, supra note 177, at 281 ("[A] lot of things need
to be balanced against privacy and security needs .... [But] it is not an either/or, it is some-
thing that needs to be worked together.").
350. Cf Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, A Recipe for Cookies: State Regula-
tion of Consumer Marketing Information, GEO. MASON L. & ECON. RES. PAPER No. 01-04,
Feb. 2001, at 5-6 (arguing, on these grounds, that state consumer privacy law is generally
superior to federal law, although expressly declining to extend the argument to medical pri-
vacy).
351. Id. at 5.
352. Id. at 4.
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expect to be kept private, such as medical records ... [from information]
where such expectations are much less clear. 3" Presumably, if-ranging
across the states-there are strong, background expectations of privacy
regarding personal information in consumer medical records, the interest
in having varied experimental responses to situations where such expec-
tations are denied is considerably diminished.3
Second, where Kobayashi and Ribstein would apply their argument,
it depends on the notion that "competition among state laws can mute
the inefficient tendencies of interest group legislation 55 Perhaps this is
true, but that also depends on the extent to which there can be such com-
petition among state laws. With Internet privacy, crucial competitive
mechanisms seem to be (a) enforcement, by the courts, of choice of law
and choice of forum clauses and (b) the ability of web operators to
"block transmission to states that do not enforce contractual choice.
356
Even in the more general realm of Internet privacy, "a" may be an
unlikely counterfactual and "b" seems at least costly and very likely in-
tractable. To the extent that the flow of information is not readily
cabined, and where choice of law may be at issue, there may be reasons
to wonder whether regulatory reach will be at least as powerful as regu-
latory competition. In this regard the U.S./E.U. experiences with data
privacy law generally may be instructive, and at least one commentator
has argued that there are conditions under which the regulatory interests
of small states can prompt larger ones to "ratchet up" their regulatory
requirements, even to some extent past their own perceived interests (and
independent of the question whether one or another state had stumbled
upon more efficient requirements). ' Rejecting the notion that global IT
competition prompts a regulatory race to the bottom, Professor Shaffer
suggests that, although "it is not a race to anywhere in particular, it can
(more likely than not) give rise to a ratcheting up of national standards.
This is particularly the case where foreign regulation has externalities, as
is the case with data privacy protection. 35 8
Further, public choice problems may sometimes be exacerbated-
not ameliorated-at the state level. For example, for many issues,
353. Id. at 5.
354. Of course the extent to which they are diminished may vary. Certainly, there may be
significant heterogeneity in consumer preferences, interests, or expectations above some
shared baseline, and the extent to which any particular regulatory regime satisfies either base-
line needs or varied ones may be in question.
355. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 350, at 5.
356. Id. at 5-6.
357. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and Inter-
national Rules in the Ratcheting Up U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. I, 5-8
(2000).
358. Id. at 7.
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national stakeholders may be able to identify seed states in which lobby-
ing costs are relatively low, countervailing business interests are
relatively diminished, and-as is often the case-consumer interests are
diffuse and costly to organize. Success therein achieved may be more
than local: it may tend to lower the costs of lobbying in other states, pro-
ducing, in efficient fashion (for the lobbying stakeholder), a sort of
legislative cascade. 9
Finally, the notion of vigorous competition aided by the threat of vir-
tual exit seems an especially poor fit in many health care contexts.
Informed and well-counseled corporate parties may, for example, en-
gage in arms-length negotiation over choice-of-law clauses on the basis
of good and tolerably symmetric information about their own interests
and the relevant choices of law.'60 One may be less optimistic about such
negotiations between large national payers, mid-sized regional or local
providers, and individual patients, given an industry with notoriously
361whrbohpoiepoor price and quality information transparency, where both provider
practices and consumer expectations about such practices may be highly
variable, and when individual patients may require real-time trauma
treatment from a hospital with no local competition.
Of course, even to the extent that a poor fit between certain bodies of
state law may be costly, there are other possible policy responses besides
expanding the preemptive reach of HIPAA. Harmonization efforts are, as
359. Without analyzing the factors behind any particular legislative cascade, we may
observe, nonetheless, that it is not uncommon for similar legislation to be adopted across
many states following a legislative success in one particular state. For example, California was
the first to enact a data breach notification law, requiring companies to notify California resi-
dents whose unencrypted personal information was acquired by an unauthorized person.
Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
and Transp. on Data Breaches and Identity Theft, 109th Cong. 11-12 (2005) (Congressional
testimony by FTC Chairman Deborah Majoras on data breaches and identity theft, discussing
the California breach notification law, CAL. Civ. CODE § 1798.82), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/06/050616databreaches.pdf. Many states followed California's
lead, and to date, 32 states have some form of data breach notification. We do not suggest that
the states had no reason to be concerned about breach notification issues. We suggest, simply,
that the progress of follow-on legislation across the states often proceeds at a pace that sug-
gests something other than the application of policy experiments observed in different
jurisdictions, not least because the pace of adoption makes it implausible that the costs and
benefits of legislation, and its implementation, by early adopters has been analyzed by subse-
quent ones.
360. It may be, as well, that where market transactions commonly involve parties thusly
situated, there is competitive pressure in favor of the convergence of state law regimes on a
relatively efficient model, perhaps as we have seen with the dominance of Delaware corporate
law.
361. See, e.g., Robert Wood Johnson Found., Choosing a Health Care Provider: The
Role of Quality Information, Policy Brief No. 14 (May 2008), available at http://
www.rwjf.org/files/research/051508.policysynthesis.qualityinfo.brief.pdf; A DOSE OF COMPE-
TITION, supra note 69.
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noted, underway within consortia of states, as well as other possible state
law reforms. But harmonization is a costly process in itself,162 and the
results of considerable efforts under the auspices of HISPC over the past
several years-although in many regards interesting-seem partial and
limited.
Wyeth v. Levine&63-addressing very different health care policy and
legal issues-may provide an interesting contrast with present preemp-
tion considerations. In that case, petitioner argued that state law claims,
sounding in tort, that alleged a failure to adequately warn of the risks
attending use of a drug product (administered in a particular way), were
preempted by the regulatory oversight of the federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)-in particular, by the approval of the marketing
of the drug product, as safe and effective, under particular labeling, un-
der the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).3' The Court held
that they were not.:
65
Analogous implied preemption arguments are not available under
HIPAA, the federal Privacy Rule, or the Recovery Act, because the ques-
tion whether HIPAA may impliedly preempt more stringent state law
requirements is rejected, expressly, by HIPAA itself. Regulations prom-
ulgated under HIPAA with regard to "the privacy of individually
identifiable health information ... shall not supercede a contrary provi-
sion of State law, if the provision of State law imposes requirements,
standards, or implementation specifications that are more stringent than
the requirements, standards, or implementation specifications imposed
under the regulation."3' The interesting policy question, rather, comes in
two parts. First, if the preemption/non-preemption provision did not ex-
ist, would colorable-or perhaps persuasive-implied preemption
arguments be available to stakeholders burdened by state health privacy
laws? Second, if so, to what extent might such arguments work as policy
grounds for the express preemption of such state laws?
The Court's contentious decision in Wyeth 6 7 rests on the rejection of
two separate implied preemption arguments.316 First, the Court rejected the
362. Cf Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1319-20 (2000) (regarding difficulties and harms of
harmonizing privacy rules across national borders).
363. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
364. Id. at 1193-94.
365. Id. at 1190.
366. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) § 264(c)(2),
110 Star. 2033-34,42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2009).
367. Writing for the minority, Justice Alito wrote, "[t]his case illustrates that tragic facts
make bad law," and argued that, "[iun its attempt to evade Geier's applicability to this case, the
Court commits both factual and legal errors." 129 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)).
368. Id. at 1193.
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conflict preemption argument that, "it would have been impossible for
[Wyeth] to comply with the state law duty ... without violating federal
law. ' 9 Although the FDA has the power to approve (or reject) proposed or
extant labeling for a prescription drug product, FDA regulations do permit
certain provisional changes to reflect "newly acquired information" upon
the manufacturer's filing a supplemental application with the FDA (but
prior to approval of that supplemental application). " More generally, the
Court identified what it saw as "a central premise of federal drug regula-
tion that the manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label
at all times., 37 Hence, federal regulations-and in the Wyeth case, ad-
ministrative decisions reached under those regulations-do not
determine the appropriate level of warning. The appropriate level of
warning is to be determined by the manufacturer, subject to FDA review.
Absent HIPAA section 264, a different argument might be made
about health information privacy. On the one hand, health care providers
and other covered entities are free in various ways to implement their
own privacy policies. On the other hand, no such entity can make unilat-
eral changes-pending HHS approval or otherwise-to the basic
requirements of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule; neither can it modify the
rights HIPAA grants to patients and their representatives. There is, there-
fore, specific content to the requirements of federal law in the privacy
case, and private parties may comply or fail to comply with those re-
quirements, but they may not change them.372 In brief, whereas drug
manufacturers-at least arguably-may disclose certain new risk infor-
mation prior to administrative approval, health care providers may not
disclose protected PHI, as proscribed under HIPAA and the Privacy
Rule, without authorization.
Second, the Court rejected Wyeth's argument that state law decisions
regarding the adequacy of the labeling in question "would obstruct the
purposes and objectives of federal ... regulations. 37 ' Against that possi-
bility, the Court noted the absence of an express preemption provision in
the FDCA. The Court also rejected the FDA's own view that the FDCA
establishes "both a 'floor' and a 'ceiling' so that FDA approval of label-
ing ... preempts conflicting or contrary State law.' 374 Rather, the Court
369. Id. (holding otherwise at 1199).
370. Id. at 1196.
371. Id. at 1197-98.
372. As noted above, pertinent federal law includes not just HIPAA and the federal Pri-
vacy Rule but also the FTC Act and the Recovery Act.
373. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1193 (holding otherwise at 1204).
374. Id. at 1200 (internal quotations omitted) (citing 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-35
(2006)).
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preferred the FDA's older (and contrary) view that federal standards are
"a floor upon which States could build.""
Plainly, Congress now intends that HIPAA function as a floor, but
not a ceiling, for health information privacy protection. But Congress
also intends that, in general, the Office of the National Coordinator for
Health Information Technology (ONC) carry out its duties "in a manner
consistent with the development of a nationwide health information
technology infrastructure that allows for the electronic use and exchange
of information. '7 6 In particular Congress has declared that ONC activi-
ties will be directed toward "the utilization of an electronic health record
for each person in the United Sates by 2014." 77 Considerable appropria-
tions have been devoted to those HIT policy goals. To the extent that
there is, as we have discussed, some tradeoff between state law protec-
tion of health information privacy and the rate of HIT adoption, the
following question presents itself: If the costs of additional state law pro-
tections for health information privacy are substantial and "[m]any states
have a series of antiquated, fragmented, and non-standardized laws that
may unintentionally create a barrier to the appropriate exchange of elec-
tronic health information," while "comprehensive reform would be a
resource intensive task in most states, 378 what is the point at which state
law regulation of health information privacy may frustrate the larger
purpose of the Recovery Act's HIT provisions?
379
Field preemption, another type of implied preemption, may also be
an interesting issue for policy purposes. Congressional intent to preempt
state law may be inferred "where the scheme of federal regulation is suf-
ficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress
'left no room' for supplementary state regulation. '80 Such cases are not
unrelated to preemption arguments resting on the purposes and objectives
of federal law, in that the Court has held that Congressional intent to pre-
empt state law may be inferred where "the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject."38' Even though HIPAA was not intended, as
drafted, to establish comprehensive health information privacy protection,
375. Id. at 1202.
376. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), § 3001(b), 123
Stat. 115,229 (2009).
377. Id. at § 3001(a)(3)(A)(ii).
378. Roth et al., supra note 343. See supra note 342.
379. The Recovery Act provides that its two central HIT titles-tit. XIII of div. A and tit.
IV of div. B-be referred to as the "Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act" or the "HITECH Act." Recovery Act § 13001.
380. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
381. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
Spring 20101
352 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:279
between the adoption of HIPAA and the adoption of the Recovery Act,
many nonetheless would have viewed field preemption arguments as prob-
lematic in this context. For example, participants in the FTC Workshop
and other commentators had expressed concerns about possible gaps in
HIPAA,182 especially with regard to the treatment of business associates...
and, more recently, in the emerging area of PHRs.3 4 As we have noted,
however, the Recovery Act comprises provisions that address these sub-
stantial gaps with requirements (and possible penalties) pertaining to
business associates,38 new requirements pertaining to PHR vendors and
related entities,386 and provisions for new rule making in these areas by
HHS and the FTC.38 The Recovery Act also calls for further study, di-
rectly by federal agencies and otherwise under federal aegis, with
additional recommendations to Congress presumed to be forthcoming. If
federal regulation does not (or will not soon) occupy the field, at what
point might it?
There is no sure answer to the question whether the elimination of
HIPAA's Section 264 would establish the likely success of implied pre-
emption arguments in the area of health information privacy. It may be
that Wyeth has raised the bar for such arguments generally, but the extent
to which the Court will read its holding to cabin more than the reach of
the FDCA with regard to state law claims about drug labeling remains to
be seen. Such implied preemption arguments would be difficult in any
case, especially to the extent that the Court found applicable, and per-
suasive, the general notion that "the historic police powers of the States
[are] not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress"388 One might also suggest that the
substantial structural complexity of the Court's implied preemption doc-
trine is exceeded greatly by the complexity of the doctrine's semantics-
how it might be applied to novel circumstances is less clear than it could
be. Possible implied preemption arguments do, however, point to policy
grounds to consider express preemption. In brief, it is not clear that the
382. See, e.g., McAndrew, supra note 118, at 211 (regarding "certain gaps in the current
HIPAA coverage"); McGraw, supra note 31, at 146-47 ( "gap" in HIPAA coverage); Pritts,
supra note 86, at 289 ("gaps" in federal and state privacy protections).
383. McGraw, supra note 31, at 146 (identifying this as a "gap" in HIPAA); cf McAn-
drew, supra note 118, at 211-12 (noting many concerns about the lack of "level playing field"
with business associates and how business associates handle PHI).
384. McGraw, supra note 31, at 146-47 (regarding "gaps" in HIPAA coverage, espe-
cially with regard to personal health records).
385. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), §§ 13401,
13404, 123 Stat. 115, 229 (2009) (regarding the application of security provisions and penal-
ties and the application of privacy provisions and penalties, respectively).
386. Id.§ 13407.
387. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
388. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
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web of state privacy and data security protections can be read consis-
tently with federal privacy, data security, and HIT law, not least because
it cannot be read consistently on its own-often, it seems, even the pros-
pects of intrastate harmonization may be unclear. Moreover, it may be
that the larger body of state law is at odds with the balancing of policy
goals sought in federal HIT law. In particular, the Recovery Act's HIT
provisions appear to balance substantial interests in health privacy
against substantial interests in the development and adoption of interop-
erable HIT and, more than that, the actual flow of health information on
a national basis. State law provisions do not appear to strike a similar
balance, and it is not clear that they could. That is not simply a matter of
adding or subtracting cost to the acquisition of HIT hardware and soft-
ware or moving a metaphorical floor or ceiling up or down, but about
optimizing a complex set of considerations about health care practice,
health care funding, standard setting and certification, and more. The
interplay between the HIT policy and standards advisory committees
noted above should be instructive in this regard. Indeed, this Article
more generally illustrates the complexity of benefits and barriers that
may be associated with HIT, and the interrelationships between them.
Interleaving extant-and changeable-state regulatory schemes into this
developing matrix is likely a herculean task, supposing it is tractable at
all.
CONCLUSION
Health information technology shows great promise, but it will be
costly to implement on a national scale. By providing significant finan-
cial incentives, the recently enacted Recovery Act will further HIT
adoption greatly, but significant non-financial barriers remain. Perhaps
the paramount regulatory barriers are those designed to protect privacy.
Consumers clearly value health information privacy-both for the sake
of maintaining autonomy over intimate details of their lives and because
they worry about financial and physical harms that can come from data
breach. The extant mix of federal and state regulations-chiefly consent
requirements and, to a lesser extent, breach notification requirements-
also impede HIT adoption by making it more costly to share health in-
formation via interoperable systems. At the same time, many privacy
regulations do not appear to provide net benefits, at least in terms of the
tangible harms they seek to suppress. Because most benefits are likely to
be intangible, a regulatory regime that strikes the correct balance be-
tween privacy and HIT adoption can only follow a richer understanding
of patients' intrinsic valuations of privacy, which are likely to vary across
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the population and contexts of care. Further, given that consumers
clearly are concerned about their medical privacy-perhaps overly so-
the market should not be discarded as a source of privacy protection.
Calibrating the correct mix of state and federal health privacy regula-
tion also requires balance. Allowing health privacy regimes to vary
across states permits experimentation and regulations that more closely
match local privacy preferences, to the extent that preferences vary on a
state level. These benefits, however, increase the cost of developing and
implementing interoperable HIT on a national scale, as well as the cost
of the flow of health information over channels already established. Al-
though HIPAA expressly sets only a federal floor of privacy protection,
the recent federal push behind HIT adoption on a national scale, com-
bined with HIPAA and Recovery Act privacy provisions, suggest at least
a policy rationale for reconsidering the federal preemption of state health
privacy laws.
